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Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of
International Humanitarian Law to
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
JAUME SAURA*
INTRODUCTION
The deployment and operation of peacekeeping missions has been
rightly considered one of the most successful initiatives in the history of
the United Nations (UN). Despite some failures and drawbacks, the
"blue helmets," which were not originally envisaged in the Charter of the
United Nations,' have brought peace and stability to numerous cases of
domestic or international armed conflict. In 1988, UN peacekeeping
forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their contribution "to
reducing tensions where an armistice has been negotiated but a peace
treaty has yet to be established.., the forces have, by their presence,
made a decisive contribution towards the initiation of actual peace
negotiations";' and in the World Summit held at the UN headquarters in
September 2005, the Heads of State and Government of all Nations
recognized that "United Nations peacekeeping plays a vital role in
helping parties to conflict end hostilities."'
In the wake of the sixtieth anniversary of the UN's establishment,
though, it seems appropriate to review how the international
organization has approached one of the most controversial aspects of
peacekeeping: the duty of UN forces to abide by the rules of
international humanitarian law. In effect, notwithstanding the overall
* J.D., Ph.D., Professor of International Law, University of Barcelona. Visiting Professor,
Loyola Law School (Fall 2005).
I. The "constitutional bases" of peacekeeping operations can be found, though, in the different
functions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat. DEREK BowEr, UNITED
NATONS FORCES 274-301 (1964). Likewise, as noted by Professor Greenwood, their legal basis is
"rooted in the consent of the states on whose territory each force [operates] and not in the provisions
of Chapter VII of the Charter." Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and United
Nations Military Operations, I Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, IO (0998).
2. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize 1988 (Sept. 30, 1988),
available at http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1988/press.html.
3. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 6o/1, 92, U.N. Doc. A/RES/6o/i (Sept. I6, 2005).
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success of peacekeeping operations, the shocking news that a few of the
otherwise professional and law-abiding troops had committed grave
violations of the laws of war moved scholars and the UN to consider the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions and other relevant treaties to
these types of operations. Following the 1999 adoption of an internal
"Bulletin," Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian
Law,4 issued by the Secretary-General, the matter seemed to some to
have been settled for good, however some legal questions still remain.
The purpose of this Article is to ascertain the scope and degree of
the duty of UN peacekeeping forces to observe international
humanitarian norms in light of the Bulletin, on the one hand, while also
considering provisions of international humanitarian law not fully
addressed in the Bulletin. In order to do so, this Article begins with an
overview of the main features of the international peacekeeping
operations, particularly in the last few years (Part I), and of international
humanitarian law (Part II), before turning to the specific norms that are
or should be applicable to blue helmet operations and the responsibility
that the UN and/or other actors should eventually bear for their
infringement (Parts III and IV). In particular, Part IV looks beyond the
actual content of the Bulletin and examines the extent to which the
norms of international humanitarian law apply to peacekeeping
operations. This leads to the examination of some substantive areas of
the laws of war that are not mentioned, or are only partially mentioned,
in the Bulletin, including whether the duty to "ensure respect" applies to
such operations, or if it matters that the original conflict in which the
blue helmets intervened was international or non-international in nature.
This Article then examines the relationship between the 1994 Safety
Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law to ascertain
whether or not both regimes are compatible with the duties of
peacekeeping operations. And finally, having determined that the UN is
bound, generally speaking, by the Geneva Conventions and other
relevant international humanitarian rules, this Article discusses the
degree of responsibility the UN, and/or member States, must bear if a
breach is committed.
This Article concludes that whenever international humanitarian law
is otherwise applicable, and whenever international organizations
actually have the capacity to implement it, UN peacekeepers must
observe this body of law.
4. The Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian
Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) [hereinafter The Bulletin].
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I. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
When this Article went to press, the UN had sixteen designated
peacekeeping operations on the ground throughout the world.' Since
1948, the UN has authorized sixty peacekeeping operations, two of the
very first ones still being in place. The current operations move some
92,311 personnel, most of whom are military and police (76,726), and
possess an annual budget of approximately $5 billion
The purposes of these missions have varied significantly along the
years." Originally, international peacekeeping operations were intended
to be mere "interposition" forces between warring parties that had
managed to broker a truce.' Their mission was intended to "cool down"
the conflict, impede subsequent fighting, and allow the parties to reach a
final peace agreement on their own."0 Some monitoring of the truce
would also be implied in the mandate of the mission. More recently, UN
peacekeeping operations have been entrusted with wider observation
mandates (elections and transition to democracy; peace processes, rather
than just truces, etc.), as well as humanitarian crisis management, return
to normal conditions in a "failed" State, or even conflict prevention,
among others." The most ambitious operations have involved the actual
administration of an entire territory for a framed period of time,'" with
the UN acting as a "government" in the sense this term is used when
5. UN Department of Public Information, Peace and Security, U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
Background Note, U.N. Doc. No. DPI/i634/Rev.65 (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/bnoteoioioi.pdf [hereinafter Background Note]. Seven of them are in Africa (in
Western Sahara, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Ivory Coast), one in America
(Haiti), five in Asia (India/Pakistan, East Timor, and three in the Middle East) and three in Europe
(Cyprus, Georgia, and Kosovo). Id. Except where otherwise indicated, facts in this Article are current
as of September 30, 20o6.
6. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East was
established in 1948. UNTSO, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/untso/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
The United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed in
January of 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. UNMOGIP, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
Since renewed hostilities in 1971, it monitors the ceasefire called for by the Security Council. Id.
7. See Background Note, supra note 5.
8. MARl KATAYANAGI, HUMAN RIGHTS FUNCTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
42-54 (2002); UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS. A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 3-9
(3d ed. 1996); see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations, 1$ 15-28, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/ 5 5/ 305 -S/2ooo/8o9 (Aug. 21, 2000).
9. KATAYANAGI, supra note 9, at 42-54.
Io. Id.
I I. See description of the different "generations" of UN peacekeeping operations in KATAYANAGI,
supra note 8, at 42-54.
12. Michael Bothd, Peacekeeping, in I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 648,
681-83 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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referring to the elements of sovereign States. 3 Such was the case in
Cambodia (1991-93)," East Timor (I999-2oo2),"5 and Kosovo (since
1999)Y6
In spite of the evolving nature of UN peacekeeping functions,
several elements are common to all these operations. First, they are not
"peace enforcement" operations, i.e., international sanctions that imply
"action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace or security" under the terms of article 42 of
the UN Charter. Thus operations "authorized" by the Security Council
in Korea (1950) or Iraq (I99 o ) would neither fall in the peacekeeping
category, nor pose the problems relating to the application of
international humanitarian law that are outlined below. For this reason, a
second element common to all peacekeeping operations is the agreement
of the State or States concerning troop deployment.'7 In fact, not only
sovereign States but warring "factions," i.e., non-state militias, within a
State should agree to the deployment and mandate of force.' 8 The form
of this consent is not important and can be expressed either before or
after the formal formation of the operation.' 9 However, it is indisputable
that when consent to peacekeeping troops was not given or was
somehow forced on the parties (as with the warring Somalia factions or
the Bosnian Serbs in the early 199os), the peacekeeping operations
ended in a dramatic failure, both for the civilian population who trusted
these forces and for some of the troops themselves.2 Third, peacekeeping
troops are not supposed to resort to the use of armed force to carry out
their mandate.' Traditionally, peacekeeping forces are only allowed to
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201
(1987); see also Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. I, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100,
165 L.N.T.S. 21, 25.
14. Jordi Sellar6s, Administraci6n Internacional de un Estado por Naciones Unidas: Camboya
1991-1993 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universidad de Barcelona) (abstract available at
http://www.iccspain.org/tesis/).
15. Jaume Saura, Free Determination and Genocide in East Timor, 3 HUM. RTS. REV. 34, 49 (2oo2).
16. WILLIAM O'NEILL, Kosovo: AN UNFINISHED PEACE 15,37-40 (2001).
17. Greenwood, supra note t, at Io; Brian Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61, 77 (1997).
18. Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations
Peacekeeping Forces, 294 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 227, 228 (0993).
19. Both6, supra note 12, at 681 ("The agreement may take the form of an agreement between
the parties to a conflict, the acceptance of a resolution by those parties individually expressed by each
of them or an agreement between the UN and the State on whose territory the unit is to function.").
20. In Bosnia, the "safe area" of Srebrenica was taken by Serb paramilitaries in August 1995-
and some 8oo civilians massacred -just by asking the impotent blue helmets to leave. CARINA FAUR ET
AL., EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO Y SU APLICACI6N: EL CONFLICTO EN LA ANTIGUA
YUGOSLAVIA 1991-1995, at 265-71 (2001). A few months earlier, peacekeeping troops had been
captured, handcuffed to strategic bridges, and used as human shields in order to avoid the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) air strikes against Serbian positions. Id.
21. Greenwood, supra note 1, at II; Tittemore, supra note 17, at 77.
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use force in self-defense, but this term has been interpreted differently,
depending on the operation. In a narrow sense, it means that blue
helmets may only use force when actually attacked; in a wider sense, the
blue helmets can also resort to force when they are prevented from
carrying out their mission.2 In this respect, it is worth noting that the
more recent peacekeeping operations have been established by the
Security Council under the Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter, i.e.,
in situations that constitute "threats to the peace."23 This allows the
mission to use "action... as may be necessary" to carry out its
mandate. 4 Agreement of the relevant parties continues to be required,
but the degree of force that can be employed by the peacekeepers and
the range of situations in which they may need to resort to it are
generally broader. In the Congo, for instance, forces for the United
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) are
supporting the armed forces of the government to restore the authority
of the Congolese State in areas of the country that are controlled by
rebel forces. In such cases, it is hard to see how all the parties may have
actually consented to the deployment of peacekeeping troops. For this
reason, the question of whether the laws and customs of war are even
applicable to these operations is of paramount importance.
Admittedly, the distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping
operations becomes blurred when Chapter VII and the authorization of
necessary means are used in both types of actions, and when
enforcement takes place in post-conflict situations, such as Kosovo
(Kosovo Force (KFOR), coexisting with a true peacekeeping operation)
or Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
22. Greenwood, supra note I, at is; Tittemore, supra note 17, at 77.
23. U.N. Charter art. 39. The UN has established eight new peacekeeping operations since 200o.
In six of them, the resolution establishing the operation explicitly invokes Chapter VII of the Charter.
See S.C. Res. 159o, at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/i59o (Mar. 24, 2005) (Sudan); S.C. Res. I545, at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004) (Burundi); S.C. Res. 14io, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 4 Io (May 17,
2004) (East Timor); S.C. Res. 1542, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 1528,
at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I528 (Feb. 27, 2004) (Ivory Coast); S.C. Res. 15o9, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/15o 9
(Sept. 19, 2003) (Liberia). Only the "classic" interposition mission between Ethiopia and Eritrea and
the latest mission in East Timor do not explicitly mention Chapter VII. See S.C. Res. 1704, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/17o4 (Aug. 25, 2o06) (East Timor); S.C. Res. I43O, U.N. Doc. S/RES/14 3o (Aug. 14, 2002)
(Eritrea); S.C. Res. 1312, U.N. Doe. S/RES/13I2 (July 31, 2000) (Ethiopia).
24. U.N. Charter art. 42. Out of the six operations currently based on Chapter VII, only the
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is not expressly authorized to use all necessary means to
carry out its mandate. Although the original mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) did not include such authorization, Security Council Resolution 1701 of Aug. II, 2oo6
dramatically expanded the operation (from 2ooo to 15,ooo) and amended its mandate to include
authorization "to take all necessary action." S.C. Res. 1701, 1 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/170I (Aug. is,
2006).
25. UN Peacekeeper, DR of Congo Troops and Scores of Ugandan Rebels Killed in Sweep, UN
NEWS SERV., Dec. 27, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=
17042&Cr=Democratic&CrI =Congo&KwI =congo&Kw2=&Kw3=#.
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coexisting with a larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
operation, to which the Afghan government "consented"). This Article
will focus only on those peacekeeping operations that are considered as
such by the UN, and are thus coordinated by the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and fall under its actual command and control.
B. STATUS AND LEGAL NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES
Within the institutional structure of the UN, peacekeeping
operations are "subsidiary organs" established by a principal organ,
usually the Security Council, 6 in accordance with article 7.2 of the UN
Charter." In fact, as Both6 points out, they are hybrid organs since they
also form part of the Secretariat (Department of Peacekeeping
Operations)."s In any case, they act on behalf of the UN and their
members are considered to be "international agents," i.e., persons who
have been "charged by an organ of the Organization with carrying out,
or helping carrying out, one of its functions - in short, any person
through whom it acts."29 They are thus protected by article 105 of the UN
Charter and by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations.3 °
The legal status of peacekeeping forces as subsidiary organs of the
UN does not preclude the UN's need to reach agreements in order to
establish the forces. The UN should first reach agreements with troop-
contributing States, since neither the missions nor their personnel are
standing organs or servants of the UN. The UN should then reach
agreement with the host State, since the very nature of the peacekeeping
operation calls for a specific arrangement relating to the privileges and
immunities of the troops on the ground.3 Following a significant surge of
demand for peacekeeping troops in the late i980s,3' the General
26. The General Assembly did establish some of the first peacekeeping operations under the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution. G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 3 77(V) (Nov. 3, 1950). It is
well-accepted now, though, that this function belongs to the Security Council according to its "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 24.
27. The U.N. Charter states that "[s]uch subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be
established in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. Charter art. 7.2.
28. Bothd, supra note 12, at 686.
29. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. I77 (Apr. iI).
30. Ray Murphy, United Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian Law: What
Rules Apply to Peacekeepers?, 14 CRIM. L.F. 153, 159 (2003); see Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, opened for signature Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. I418, I U.N.T.S. 15
(corrigendum available at 90 U.N.T.S. 327); U.N. Charter art. 1O5. The Convention was adopted by
General Assembly Resolution 22(I)(A). G.A. Res. 22(I)(A), U.N. Doc. AIRES/22(I) (Feb. 13, 1946).
As of 2005, there are 141 states who are parties to it. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, http://untreaty.un.org/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partl/chapterlll/treatyi.asp
(last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
3 1. Bowett, supra note i, at 432-55 (discussing status of forces agreements).
32. In the first thirty-nine years of UN peacekeeping operations, between 1948 and 1987, the UN
[VOL. 58:479
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Assembly adopted two "model" agreements, drafted by the Secretary-
General, that set forth the status of the peacekeeping forces both in the
host State and the relationship between the contributing State(s) and the
UN. They are the "Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping
Operations" (SOFA)33 and the "Model agreement between the United
Nations and Member States contributing personnel and equipment to
United Nations peacekeeping operations" ("Model Contributing
Agreement").34 Both model agreements are inspired by past UN
practices and are intended to apply upon concretion and specific
signature on a case-by-case basis.35 Recent practice shows that SOFAs
may apply provisionally, pending the actual conclusion of a treaty
between the UN and the host country. 6
The model agreement confirms that peacekeeping operations are
subsidiary organs of the UN.37 The operations are therefore entitled to
the privileges and immunities established in the Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations and in the SOFA. The SOFA
devotes a great deal of attention to the facilities, privileges, and
immunities owed by the host State to the operation and its personnel." In
particular, the SOFA states that "[a]ll members of the UN peacekeeping
operation... shall be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity."39 If military members of the operation are suspected of having
committed a criminal offense, including war crimes, they "shall be
established thirteen peacekeeping operations. See United Nations, Peacekeeping, List of Operations,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). It only took four more years for
the next thirteen operations to be established. Id.
33. The Secretary-General, Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 199o) [hereinafter SOFA].
34. The Secretary-General, Model agreement between the United Nations and Member States
contributing personnel and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/46/i85 (May 23, I99I) [hereinafter Model Contributing Agreement].
35. Paragraph i of both resolutions states that the model agreements are based "upon established
practice and drawing extensively upon earlier and current agreements." Model Contributing
Agreement, supra note 34, 91 1: SOFA, supra note 33, 1 1. The models are "subject to modifications
that may be agreed upon between the parties in each case." Model Contributing Agreement, supra note
34,1 1; SOFA, supra note 33, s.
36. This is so by virtue of the Security Council Resolution establishing the mission. See S.C. Res.
1509, supra note 23, 91 7 (establishing the UN mission in Liberia) ("[The Security Council] [riequests
the Liberian Government to conclude a status-of-force agreement with the Secretary-General within
3o days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the
model status-of-force agreement dated 9 October 199o (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally."); see also
S.C. Res. 1590, supra note 23, 91 6(ii) (Sudan); S.C. Res. 1545, supra note 23, 91 o (Burundi); S.C. Res.
1542, supra note 23, 1 11 (Haiti); S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 23, 91 9 (Ivory Coast).
37. Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 1 4; SOFA, supra note 33, 1 15.
38. The SOFA deals, among other things, with issues such as the right to use the UN flag in
vehicles, vessels and aircraft, facilities in the field of communications, travel and transport, privileges
and immunities of the operation, and its personnel. SOFA, supra note 33, at 11 8-15, 24-50.
39. Id. 1 46 (emphasis added).
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subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating
States."' Such States must be prepared to exercise jurisdiction "with
respect to crimes or offences which may be committed by members of
their national contingents serving with the peacekeeping operation."4
The characterization of peacekeeping forces and troops as UN
agents is, admittedly, somewhat biased by their military nature. Although
civilians and police forces are also part of peacekeeping operations, the
core of these units is the military.' The Model Contributing Agreement
acknowledges the dual nature of the troops, and it provides that the
personnel "shall remain in their national service but shall be under the
command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under
the authority of the Security Council."43 This provides several layers of
authority in peacekeeping operations.' The Security Council establishes
the functions and mandate of the mission. The Secretary-General has
"full authority over the deployment, organization, conduct and
direction" of the operation. 5 This authorizes the Secretary-General to
issue "the regulations of the force ' 46 or "rules of engagement. '47 On the
field, the Secretary-General delegates to a Head of Mission who has
"general responsibility for the good order and discipline of the
[operation]." Thus far, only the UN, through its different organs and
agents, bears responsibility for the actions or omissions of the mission.
One final layer of command for each national contingent remains: the
Model Contributing Agreement calls for a national commander who is
responsible "for disciplinary action with respect to military personnel
made available by [the participating State]."'49 In theory, troops "shall not
40. Id. 47.
41. Id. 48. This is confirmed by the Model Contributing Agreement, according to which "[The
participating State] agrees to exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences which may be
committed by its military personnel." Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 25.
42. If we look again at the most recently established peacekeeping operations, figures are
overwhelming: in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), 3156 out of 3790
personnel are troops; Liberia, 14,576 out of 17,371; Congo, 6705 out of 8659; Haiti, 6311 out of 9153;
Burundi, 3387 out of 4269; and Sudan, 8895 out of 12,273. See Background Note, supra note 5. The
non-military contingent is composed of military observers, police, international civilians, local civilians
and UN Volunteers. Id. In contrast, UNTSO and UNMOGIP, established in 1948 and 1949, do not
have troops, but only military observers and civilian personnel. Id. The same is true of the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Id.
43. Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 7.
44. Murphy, supra note 30, at 16o.
45. Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 7.
46. Murphy, supra note 3o, at I6o.
47. Paolo Benvenuti, Le respect du droit international humanitaire par les forces des Nations
Unies: la circulaire du Secretaire general, lo5 REVUE GENERAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 366
(zooI). Rules of Engagement are primarily aimed "to control the use of military force that exceeds the
use of self-defense." GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPs, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
PEACEKEEPERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ioi (2004).
48. Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 8.
49. Id.
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seek or accept instructions in respect of the performance of their duties
from any authority external to the United Nations, nor shall the
Government of [the participating State] give such instructions to them."'
This, however, has not always been the case, and lack of discipline"' or
"tensions between UN direction and, sometimes contrary, national
understanding and expectations" 2 are likely to occur.
It. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: BASIC FEATURES
International humanitarian law encompasses the norms of
international law that govern the conduct of belligerent parties during
armed conflicts. These norms include restrictions on the right of the
parties to use means and methods of combat during actual hostilities, as
well as the treatment of non-combatants, i.e., those who no longer can
fight (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, and prisoners of war) and those who
have never fought (civilians). 3 They also deal with the status of certain
qualified people (e.g., journalists, members of the Red Cross) and with
the protection of certain goods (e.g., historic and religious sites)." Some
have argued that international humanitarian law is nothing but the
application of international human rights law during a time of war; and
though there is no doubt about the relationship between both areas of
international law,55 it is important to stress their structural differences.
Humanitarian law appears much earlier in the history of international
relations (mid-nineteenth century), has a different legal and
philosophical basis (the balance between military necessity and
humanity), 6 and is much wider in scope (it deals not only with how States
treat individuals, but also with how hostilities should be conducted, the
prohibition or limitation of certain weapons, the protection of sites and
"dangerous forces," etc.). At the same time, the application of
international humanitarian law is much narrower: it only applies within
50. Id. 91 9.
51. See RICHARD SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO 165 (I 968). Professor Simmonds stresses the problem of the attitude of
contributing States in relation to the strategic and political direction of the Force in the Congo
operation: "Particularly disturbing was the order given by the Government of Morocco in January
1961 to its brigade 'to cease to perform its function' while remaining in the Congo." Id. Later on, and
in another front, it was reported that "the Commanding officer of the [United Arab Republic]
battalion in the Congo had declined to comply with a UN Commander's order to shift his men from
the Equator Province to Kasai." Id.
52. H. McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Action in the
"New World Order", i INT'L L. & ARMED CONFLICT COMMENT. 36, 39 (1994) (citing, among others, the
situation of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia).
53. See id. at 43 (discussing the topics of the four Geneva Conventions).
54. See id. at to9.
55. Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vit6, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law, 293 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 94 (19 9 3 ); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law,
94 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 239, 240 (2000).
56. Doswald-Beck & Vit6, supra note 55, at 95.
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the framework of an armed conflict, whereas human rights law applies in
times of peace and, with the exception of a few rights that have been
expressly suspended, human rights law also applies in times of war. 7
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note
that whether or not international humanitarian law applies to
peacekeeping operations, such operations have a continuing duty to
respect the general international law of human rights.
The first international instruments on the laws of war date back to
the second half of the nineteenth century,5 and they currently comprise
more than a hundred different legal texts.59 Among them, the basic
treaties dealing with jus in bello can be currently narrowed to the Fourth
Hague Convention (I9o7), 60 the Four Geneva Conventions (1949)6, with
their two additional Protocols (I977), 6' as well as the UNESCO
57. The International Court of Justice has stated that "the protection of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4
of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency."
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8)
[hereinafter Use of Nuclear Weapons]. The ICJ has confirmed this approach in its Advisory Opinion
of July 9, 2004 entitled the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law,
there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of
international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet
others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian
law.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9) [hereinafter Construction of a Wall].
58. E.g., Declaration of Saint Petersburg Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, adopted Dec. I I, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940,
i Bevans 7; Declaration of Paris Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. i
(abolishing privateers).
59. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Humanitarian Law-Treaties &
Documents, http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Jan. 4, 2007) (providing a database of the text of the
above and other treaties and instruments of international humanitarian law).
60. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. i8, 19o7, 36 Stat. 2277, 1
Bevans 631 [hereinafter War on Land and its Annex].
61. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention];
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. r2, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention] [hereinafter collectively referred to as Geneva Conventions].
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977,
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Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict (195 4).6 The tangled relationship among the different
sources of international humanitarian law, which together form a single
system of norms, was appropriately emphasized by the International
Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:
A large number of customary rules have been developed by the
practice of States and are an integral part of the international law
relevant to the question posed. The "laws and customs of war"-as
they were traditionally called-were the subject of efforts at
codification undertaken in The Hague (including the Conventions of
1899 and 1907) .... This "Hague Law" and, more particularly, the
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, fixed
the rights and duties of belligerents in their conduct of operations and
limited the choice of methods and means of injuring the enemy in an
international armed conflict. One should add to this the "Geneva Law"
(the Conventions of 1864, 19o6, 1929 and 1949), which protects the
victims of war and aims to provide safeguards for disabled armed
forces personnel and persons not taking part in the hostilities. These
two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict have become so
closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually formed
one single complex system, known today as international humanitarian
law. The provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977 give expression
and attest to the unity and complexity of that law. 64
It is beyond the scope of this Article to try to summarize
international norms relating to humanitarian law.65 Some basic elements
and features of this set of rules, however, are well worth emphasizing, in
particular the evolutionary character of humanitarian law, its customary
nature in general international law, the distinction between norms
applying to international and non-international armed conflicts, and the
scope of duty to "respect and ensure respect" in Common Article I to
the Geneva Conventions.
i. International law, like any domestic legal system, is a social
product: it "carries the structures and systems of society through time"; it
"inserts the common interests of society into the behavior of society-
members"; and it "establishes possible futures for society, in accordance
with society's theories, values and purposes. 6 6 In fact, if law
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
63. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
64. Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 57, at 256.
65. For examples of recent manuals on this topic written in English, see INGRID DETrER, THE LAW
OF WAR (2d ed. 2000); LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLIcT (2d ed. 2ooo);
FRITs KALSHOVEN & LISBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR (3d ed. 2001). For an
example of a recent manual written in French, see ERIC DAVID, PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES
CONFLITS ARMIES (1999).
66. Philip Allot, The Concept of International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
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predominantly follows rather than shapes societies, this is particularly
true with respect to international humanitarian law. During the last 150
years, countries have shown a clear ability to outgrow pre-existing rules
of international humanitarian law. As Meron puts it, "[c]alamitous
events and atrocities have repeatedly driven the development of
international humanitarian law. The more offensive or painful the
suffering, the greater the pressure for accommodating humanitarian
restraints. Throughout the years, new weapons (chemical warfare in
World War I, nuclear weapons in World War II), new means of warfare
(guerrilla), new actors in warfare (national liberation movements), and
new atrocities committed on civilians or prisoners of war have forced
States to constantly update the principles and norms of humanitarian
law.6 Thus, the established rules may be insufficient to govern new
armed conflicts. This is what makes the inclusion of the "Martens
Clause" in the Hague Convention so important. The Martens Clause has
also been incorporated into other humanitarian treaties, the latest being
the Additional Protocol I of 1977. The Martens Clause provides:
[I]n cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them [the High
Contracting Parties] the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
69
The Martens Clause provides a counterweight to a literal
interpretation of law7 and reminds us that whatever is not expressly
prohibited in the corpus of humanitarian law is not necessarily thereby
permitted. 7' This allows UN peacekeeping operations to fit within the
normative scope of humanitarian law even though such operations were
not originally contemplated by the instruments of international
humanitarian law.
2. The Martens Clause is also proof that most of international
humanitarian law has become customary international law72 binding on
POLMcs 69,69 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
67. Meron, supra note 55, at 243.
68. Victoria AbellAn, El Derecho Humanitario B9lico: Evoluci6n Hist6rica, in LA REGULACI6N
JURfDICA INTERNACIONAL DE LOS CONFLICTOs ARMADOS 73 (1992) (noting that "cualquier avance en las
normas humanitarias en los conflictos armadas ha tenido el alto coste de una prictica anterior cada
vez mis cruel e inhumana.").
69. War on Land and its Annex, supra note 6o, art. i.
70. DETTER, supra note 65, at 376. According to the ICJ, the Martens Clause "has proved to be an
effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology." Use of Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 57, at 257.
7. RoSARIo DoMfNGUEZ MATIS, LA PROTECCI6N DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE EN EL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO 297 (2005).
72. DETTER, supra note 65, at 376. Pons underlines the link between natural law and positive law
operated by the Martens Clause. Xavier Pons Rafols, Revisitando a Martens: Las normas bdsicas de
humanidad en la Comisi6n de Derechos Humanos, in 2 SOBERANfA DEL ESTADO Y DERECHO
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all States and other subjects of international society. After the second
World War, the Nuremberg Tribunal acknowledged the customary
nature of the rules embodied in the Hague Convention.73 One hundred
and ninety-four States have ratified the four Geneva Conventions,74
making them universal almost without the need to resort to customary
law considerations. The only gray area could be the two 1977 Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Though participation in both
instruments is impressive (166 and 162 parties respectively),75
participation is not actually universal, and among those who have not
ratified either, or both, instruments are countries as significant as the
United States. Nonetheless, the disagreement on the part of States that
have not ratified the Protocols rests mostly on very specific issues, such
as the inclusion of colonial wars as international armed conflicts in
Protocol I, rather than non-international ones (Protocol II). 76 There is
little doubt that provisions of the Protocols that simply restate or update
norms from the Geneva and Hague Conventions are generally applicable
as customary international law.77 In addition, the fact that the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court includes a number of crimes
considered to be grave breaches exclusively by the Protocols as war
crimes is evidence of the customary character of such norms.7
3. International humanitarian law traditionally dealt only with
international armed conflicts, that is, conflicts between two or more
sovereign States. Domestic conflicts or civil wars were considered
"internal affairs" in which third parties, or the rules of international law,
INTERNACIONAL: HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JUAN ANTONIO CARRILLO SALCEDO 1095, 1104 (2005).
73. "The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal... found in 1945 that the humanitarian
rules included in the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 'were recognized by all
civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."' Use of
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 57, at 258; see also Meron, supra note 55, at 248.
74. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law-Treaties & Documents, 1949 Conventions &
Additional Protocols, http://www.icrc.orglihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
75. Id. The 1954 UNESCO Convention has only 114 parties. Data on participation in these and
other international humanitarian law treaties can be found at the web page of the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Id.
76. A message from the President of the United States regarding Protocol H Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, in
How DOEs LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 603-05 (Marco Sass6li & Antoine Bouvier eds., 1999).
77. "In particular, the Court recalls that all States are bound by those rules in Additional Protocol
I which, when adopted, were merely the expression of the pre-existing customary law, such as the
Martens Clause, reaffirmed in the first article of Additional Protocol I." Use of Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 57, 1 84.
78. Article 8 of the ICC Statute defines "war crimes" as "grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949" and of "article 3 common" to the four Conventions in paragraphs 2.a)
and c). Paragraphs b) and e) are then devoted to "other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflict" of international and non-international nature respectively, thus implying
that the list of twenty-six and twelve specific crimes therein, which are directly taken from the
Protocols, are based on norms of international customary law. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2178 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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should not interfere.79 This perspective started to change with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which established minimum rules
for parties in an armed conflict that is not international in nature.8°
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions builds upon Common
Article 3 by establishing greater protection for victims of non-
international armed conflicts. Nonetheless, the truth is that the rationale
behind many of the rules dealing with international armed conflicts (i.e.,
that these are conflicts between "States" and not individuals) does not
apply to civil wars."' This results in striking differences of treatment in
otherwise similar situations. Thus, for instance, an "enemy combatant" in
an international armed conflict is not a criminal per se, even if that
person has killed soldiers during the war; when he is captured, the only
point of his "prisoner of war" status is simply to keep him away from the
conflict and from helping his own country; prisoner of war status is not
,, ,, 82
meant to "punish" him. In contrast, the rebel in a civil war is a criminal,
a "traitor" who is subject to criminal prosecution according to domestic
law." The notion of "prisoner of war" does not exist in non-international
armed conflicts. Generally speaking, only the very basic humanitarian
norms apply as a minimum set of rules of conduct for the parties in non-
international conflicts, such as the notion that certain rights must be
respected "in all circumstances" and that certain practices are never
tolerable (as envisaged by the Martens Clause). The link between the
international law of human rights and international humanitarian law
appears clearer than ever in non-international armed conflicts for they
both attempt to spell out the actual threshold that States should never
cross with regard to their own population, despite political unrest,
domestic conflict, or open civil war.
79. GREEN, supra note 65, at 54, 317.
8o. "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely" without discrimination. First Geneva Convention, supra note 6L, art. 3. To this end, "the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons": violence to the person, murder, torture, taking of hostages, outrages
upon personal dignity, and the passing of sentences without due process. Id.
8I. See DE-rER, supra note 65, at 3-5 (concluding nonetheless that war is "essentially a
relationship by armed force between individuals"); see also GREEN, supra note 65, at 327
(acknowledging that "in non-international armed conflicts it is perhaps more necessary to make
provision for the protection of those who fall into the hands of their opponents than is the case in an
international conflict when ideologies and emotions are not normally so important").
82. See, e.g., Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, General Orders No. ioo, art. 56 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
to (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Tomas eds., 3d. ed. 1988) ("A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment
for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any
suffering, or disgrace ...."); see also DETTER, supra note 64, at 327 ("The essence of the treatment of
prisoners of war is that it must not constitute a sanction but a set of precautionary measures.").
83. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the regular soldier, if we adopt the rebels' point of
view.
84. See Doswald-Beck & Vitd, supra note 55, at I12.
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4. Common Article I of the Geneva Conventions provides that it is a
duty of all States to "respect" and to "ensure respect" of the norms of
international humanitarian law "in all circumstances." As with any other
binding norms of international law (be it treaty-based or customary),
States have the duty to "respect" them. The fact that they have to do so
"in all circumstances" has been widely understood as derogating the old
si omnes clause that would make the laws of war applicable only "if all"
warring parties were also parties to the relevant convention.
International humanitarian law, like international human rights law, is
not based on reciprocity. On the contrary, a State continues to be bound
by the core norms even if its rival is in breach. The concept of "counter-
measure" does not apply."' But then what does the duty to "ensure
respect" mean? Since norms of international humanitarian law have an
erga omnes nature, 86 there is wide consensus on the idea that States have
the duty to "ensure" that other States also comply with such norms.87 In
other words, all States have a general duty to enforce these norms by, for
example, adopting international sanctions or other appropriate
81
measures, when another State violates these norms. In fact, a closer
look at the travaux preparatoires of Common Article I shows that the
purpose of the drafters in 1949 was not so advanced for its time. The
''ensure respect" clause was meant to emphasize the duty of all States to
enforce humanitarian norms at the domestic level, and apply them to all
relevant actors within the State structure." This interpretation has
evolved along with current developments in contemporary international
law. According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, States have
the duty to cooperate to bring an end to serious violations of peremptory
norms of international law. This includes their right to adopt measures of
enforcement against a blatant violation of jus cogens committed by any
third party; but there seems to be no duty to do so, except when
mandated by the competent international organ (e.g., the Security
Council).' Nonetheless, in the context of the Geneva Conventions, the
85. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 Annex, arts.
49-50, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83/Annex (Jan. 28, 2002).
86. They are owed to the international community as a whole, not to a particular State or group
of States.
87. See KNooPs, supra note 47, at 81.
88. Cf. id. at 81-82 (arguing that, in the case of the UN, "a United Nations force has a duty to
take action against violations of international humanitarian law by others, regardless of whether it is
itself a party to an armed conflict").
89. See Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances:
From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 3-23 (999).
9o. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 85, art. 41.1
(affirming that "States shall cooperate to bring an end through lawful means any serious breach" of
peremptory norms of international law (emphasis added)). This duty to cooperate includes the right to
adopt "lawful measures" against the State in breach. Id. art. 54. The Draft Articles reflect norms of
customary international law and are thus binding on all states irrespective of the draft nature of the
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International Court of Justice has recently accepted the interpretation of
Common Article i as establishing a duty on all parties to force
compliance, by lawful means, on a non-complying party.'
International humanitarian law, and the humanization that it brings
to modern warfare, is now a core element of contemporary international
law. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent international
humanitarian law is mandatory for troops in the type of mission
described in Part I above; under what circumstances; with which
limitations, restrictions, or adaptations, if any; and, finally, whose
responsibility it is to comply with these humanitarian norms. After years
of denial and doubt, the Secretary-General seems to have settled the
question by adopting a three-page internal Bulletin on the observance by
United Nations forces of international humanitarian law. The next Part
examines its scope and contents.
III. OBSERVANCE BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN
There is little doubt today that international humanitarian law is
fully applicable to State-led "peace enforcement" operations authorized
by the Security Council. In spite of initial arguments to the contrary
when the UN was first formed,92 these national troops are "belligerents"
in every sense of the term, and the "fairness" of their purpose, or the fact
that they have the blessings of the Security Council, is irrelevant to their
duties to uphold the laws of war, just as it is irrelevant in other contexts
that a belligerent State is considered to be an "aggressor" or to be acting
in "self-defense." Humanitarian norms must be respected by everyone
text.
9I. As noted in Construction of a Wall:
Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the Court is
of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation
resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. It is also for all States,
while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any
impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian
people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end. In addition, all the States
parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter
and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as
embodied in that Convention.
Construction of a Wall, supra note 57, at 61(emphasis added). The implications of this obligation on
peacekeeping operations will be examined infra, in Part IV.A.
92. Still in more recent times, some authors have claimed that international humanitarian law
should never be applicable to U.N. operations, whatever their nature. See, e.g., Walter Sharp,
Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 93, 163 (1996)
(arguing that U.N. forces should be accorded special protected status, making it unlawful to target
them, even when they are using force to accomplish their mission).
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"in all circumstances."93
The main theoretical problem with compelling peacekeeping
operations to abide by international humanitarian norms is that it is
difficult to consider the blue helmets as "belligerents" in the traditional
sense of the word. As noted above, the blue helmets operate with the
consent of the parties: no use of force has been needed to deploy the
troops on the ground and their mandate does not necessarily imply the
use of armed force.' In fact, UN forces and other UN personnel have
often been the victims of hostile action by warring actors rather than the
perpetrators of violence against those factions.95 This led to the 1994
adoption of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel,96 which expanded and updated the privileges and
immunities of UN "agents" established in older treaties."
For decades, the United Nations was "disinclined to recognize the
applicability of international humanitarian law to UN forces or to abide
formally by its provisions." ' In 1978, the UN formally acknowledged, in
an exchange of letters and documents with the International Committee
of the Red Cross, its duty to comply with "the principles and spirit" of
international humanitarian law. 99 This commitment was upgraded to an
actual agreement between the UN and a contributing State in 1993,"
following the Model Contributing Agreement adopted by the General
Assembly two years earlier.' Peacekeepers have nevertheless faced
93. See BOwETr, supra note i, at 495 ("A survey of the judicial decisions of international and
municipal tribunals ... tends to contradict the idea that an illegal aggressor cannot benefit, nor its
opponent be bound, by the law of war during hostilities.").
94. See discussion supra Part I.
95. According to recent news, the UN Mission in Liberia had to step up security after supporters
of former soccer star George Weah, who lost the elections in November, "attacked peacekeepers and
police officers on Monrovia's streets." World Briefing Africa: Liberia: U.N. Steps Up Security After
Clashes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at A16. A few weeks later, Weah acknowledged his defeat, thus
cooling down the situation in the country. Lydia Polgreen, World Briefing Africa: Liberia: Soccer Star
Drops Election Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at As9.
96. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, S.
TREATY Doc. 107-I, 34 I.L.M. 482 (995) (entered into force Jan. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Safety
Convention].
97. E.g., Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 28; see also
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
98. Daphna Shagra, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian
Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 406, 406 (2000).
99. Palwankar, supra note 18, at 233 (citing an "interoffice memorandum" addressed on May 24,
1978 to all commanders of UN forces then operative, as well as the reply letter of October 23, 1978 by
the UN Secretary-General to the President of the ICRC, among others).
ioo. See Shagra, supra note 98, at 406-07.
ioI. Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34. The UN peacekeeping operation
shall observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general international conventions
applicable to the conduct of military personnel. The international conventions referred to
above include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of
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sustained armed action on a number of occasions, starting with the
Congo operation in the early i96os.'°2 During the 199os, the world was
shocked to hear of cases of inhumane treatment by peacekeeping troops
(i.e., Canadian and Italian troops in Somalia), including sexual
exploitation, torture, and the murder of civilians."'3 The UN's previous
position was considered unsatisfactory, given its ambiguous and limited
scope, as the UN was considered "capable of carrying out many, if not
all, customary obligations" of international humanitarian law, and the
declaration could not "provide guidance to troops, protected persons, or
monitoring entities."' 4 These examples of misconduct and the increasing
pressure of scholars, activists, and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC),' 5 led to the Secretary-General's 1999 issuance of an
internal three-page Bulletin accepting the binding character of core
humanitarian norms on UN operations, for both those with enforcement
mandates as well as those with "peacekeeping" mandates "when the use
of force is permitted in self-defense.""' 6 Unfortunately, the Bulletin has
not stopped allegations of misconduct and lack of accountability for
peacekeepers,"'1 and the Secretary-General has been forced to adopt new
measures that fall beyond the scope of this Article.
'8
Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict. [The participating State] shall therefore
ensure that the members of its national contingent serving with [the UN peacekeeping
operation] be fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of the Conventions.
Id. 28 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that such commitment appears only in the model
agreement between the UN and the contributing State, but not in the SOFA, between the UN and the
host State, in which it would be at least as relevant as in the former.
102. See BOWETr, supra note I, at 166, 173.
103. See Robert M. Young & Maria Molina, IHL and Peace Operations: Sharing Canada's Lessons
Learned from Somalia, I Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 362 (1998) for an account of the facts and their
aftermath. See also Natalia Lupi, Report by the Inquiry Commission on the Behaviour of Italian Peace-
Keeping Troops in Somalia, 1 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 375 (1998).
104. Richard D. Glick, Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Armed Forces, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 53, 79, 8I (I997). According to Shagra, "the 'principles and spirit'
clause proved inadequate and too abstract to guide members of peacekeeping operations on questions
of practical application." Shagra, supra note 98, at 407.
1o5. See, e.g., BowErr, supra note I, at 510-II ("A simpler solution ... would be for the General
Assembly to resolve that the Conventions were applicable to United Nations Forces."): see also
Palwankar, supra note 18, at 229-32 (providing the position of the ICRC).
1o6. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § i.i. For a review of the Bulletin, see, for example, Benvenuti,
supra note 47, at 355; Luigi Condorelli, Le azioni dell'ONU e l'applicazione del diritto internazionale
umanitario: il 'bollettino' del Segretario generale del 6 agosto 1999, 82 RIVISTA DE DIRITrO
INTERNAZIONALE 1049 (I999); Shagra, supra note 98, at 406-o9.
107. See Jennifer Murray, Who Will Police the Peace-Builders? The Failure to Establish
Accountability for Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 475, 503-06 (2OO3); see also AMNESTY
INT'L, THE APPARENT LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN Kosovo
AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 1-4 (2004), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EURo5oo22oo4ENGLISH/
$File/EURo5002o4 .pdf.
io8. See The Secretary-General, Secretary-General's Bulletin, Special Measures for Protection from
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, U.N. Doc. STISGBI2oo31I3 (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
Exploitation and Abuse].
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The Bulletin has been characterized as an "instrument whose form is
unusual and modest, but whose substance is very important.""' The
Bulletin is intended to be binding on UN personnel, both because of its
characterization as "internal law" within the UN's own legal system,"'
and its implementation of binding norms..' stemming "from the United
Nations' own obligations under customary international law .... With its
adoption, the UN and the Secretary-General are implementing their own
duty as "commanders" of the operation in accordance with article 87 of
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 3
As discussed above, the applicability of the Bulletin to peacekeeping
operations is, apparently, very narrow in scope. It applies "when in
situations of armed conflict [the peacekeeping forces] are actively
engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their
engagement.'' It seems that the Bulletin is only applicable to actual
combat and that only "Hague" law on the conduct of hostilities and the
use of means and methods of combat would be mandatory. But such a
narrow approach is contradicted not only by some of the substantive
rules in the Bulletin itself, but by the commitment that the UN assumes
in section 3 of the Bulletin "to ensure that the force shall conduct its
operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel."..5 If we
1o9. Benvenuti, supra note 47, at 356 ("Instrument inhabituel et modeste dans sa forme, mais tr s
important dans la substance.").
1io. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 176.
i Ii. See Benvenuti, supra note 47, at 356, 358 (stressing its "administrative-regulatory" nature).
112. KNOOPS, supra note 47, at 95. For Shagra, the Bulletin is binding on members of UN forces in
the same way as are all other instructions issued by the Secretary-General in his capacity as
commander-in-chief of UN operations; but "the source of the legal obligation, however, lies in the
international humanitarian law provisions incorporated in the respective national laws . .. or in the
customary international law provisions that are independently binding on them." Shagra, supra note
98, at 409.
113. See Benvenuti, supra note 47, at 359. Article 87 reads as follows:
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military
commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other
persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to
competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol. 2. In order to
prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall
require that, commensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that
members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the
Conventions and this Protocol. 3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict
shall require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his
control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the
Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action
against violators thereof.
Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 87.
114. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § I.I (emphasis added).
i15 . Id. § 3. Note that the reference to the "principles and spirit" of humanitarian norms has been
substituted by the more accurate "principles and rules." Section 3 refers to the status-of-forces
agreements, but "the obligation to respect the said principles and rules is applicable to United Nations
February 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
were to understand the term "operations" only in a strict military sense,
the Bulletin would be very limited in scope. Instead, we should read
"operations" in its wider and more usual sense to encompass any activity
carried out under the mission.' 6 Its ambiguous scope is arguably the most
negative and troubling aspect of the Bulletin.
Sections 5 through 9 of the Bulletin synthesize substantive norms of
international humanitarian law that must be observed by peacekeeping
(and enforcement) operations. Although it is a "short, succinct and
simplified document," these sections contain instructions that "reflect the
quintessential and most fundamental principles of the laws and customs
of war,""..7 namely: The protection of civilian populations, including the
principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, and between
civilian objects and military objectives.' 18
The means and methods of combat, include general principles such
as that "the right to choose methods and means of combat is not
unlimited" or that weapons or methods causing "superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering" are prohibited."9 Weapons prohibited by different
treaties, even if not universally ratified, are banned for UN troops. '
Section 6 of the Bulletin also prohibits any declaration that "quarter"
will not be given, i.e., it prohibits telling the surrendered or conquered
enemy that clemency will not be given. Among other things, Section 6
also forbids attacks on cultural property and attacks on objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.'2
The treatment of civilians and non-combatants is based on the
forces even in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement." Id.
116. Equivalent expressions might be "carry out its mandate" or "discharge its functions."
I I7. Shagra, supra note 98, at 408; see also Benvenuti, supra note 47, at 362 (considering it a
"synth~se efficace").
ii8. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § 5.'. It includes the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and
reprisals against civilians or civilian objects. Id. §§ 5.5, 5.6. The Bulletin extends beyond its envisaged
scope of application when determining that "military installations and equipment of peacekeeping
operations, as such, shall not be considered military objectives," a rule that is clearly addressed to
parties different from UN agents, upon which the Secretary-General has no direct authority. Id. §§ 5.4
ii9. The Bulletin, supra note 4, §§ 6.1, 6.3.
120. See Benvenuti, supra note 47, at 366 (stating that in this matter "le Secr6taire G6nfrale pose
des limites qui vont m~me au delA du contenu des conventions en vigueur." [the Secretary-General
imposes limits that go beyond the contents of conventions in force.]).
121. Shagra, supra note 98, at 408, praises the Secretary-General for not constraining himself by
the customary law dimension of international humanitarian law when including in this Section
provisions such as the prohibition on using methods of warfare intended to cause widespread, long-
term, and severe damage to the natural environment, rendering useless objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, and causing the release of dangerous forces with consequent severe
among the civilian population. She argues that these provisions were considered innovative at the time
of their adoption (977) and must still be considered "conventional international law" only. See id.
Instead, the fact that they are contained in other legal instruments (EN-MOD Convention, Statute of
the ICC...) makes me believe that these are already binding obligations under general international
law. See also DOMfNGUEZ, supra note 71, at 464, 487.
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principle of humanity. Violence against their persons, collective
punishments, reprisals, the taking of hostages, any form of sexual assault,
as well as other actions, are prohibited.'22 Moreover, paragraphs three
and four of section 7 provide special measures of protection for women
and children.'23
Detained persons, without prejudice of their legal status, shall be
treated in accordance "with the relevant provisions" of the Third Geneva
Convention, "as may be applicable to them mutatis mutandis.'..4 Thus,
they are to be treated as prisoners of war, but only concerning certain
"relevant provisions" and even those, "mutatis mutandis." Section 8
mentions some of the rights that detainees shall enjoy "in particular,"
including notification to the ICRC, which shall have the right to visit
them; safe and healthy premises; a prohibition on torture and ill-
treatment; and special measures for women and children.
The Bulletin provides for the protection of the wounded and sick,
who are to be treated humanely and receive medical care without
adverse distinction, as well as for medical and relief personnel, who shall
be respected and protected by the UN."5
The Bulletin took effect on August 12, I999, on the fiftieth
anniversary of the adoption of the Geneva Conventions.26 The
Secretary-General's acknowledgment of the applicability of international
humanitarian law to peacekeeping operations, though welcome, does not
settle the controversy. The implication in the Bulletin is that these norms
will only be mandatory to UN peacekeepers during actual hostilities
between peacekeeping forces and a State or an armed faction. In fact, the
Bulletin only mentions "self-defense," although it should be self-evident
that international humanitarian law would also be applicable when the
blue helmets receive a wider mandate and are allowed to use force to
secure their mission,"' or when they (unlawfully) use armed force despite
having no mandate to do so. The Bulletin's limited approach raises two
important flaws. First, it contradicts some of the substantive rules
embodied in the Bulletin itself, particularly section 8 and parts of
sections 7 and 9 . "8 Second, and foremost, it seems to ignore the fact that
most international humanitarian norms do not deal with the actual
122. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § 7.
123. Id. 99 7.3, 7.4.
124. Id. § 8.
125. Id. § 9 (referring in paragraphs i and 2 to the protection of the wounded and sick, and in
paragraphs 3 through 9 to the respect for medical and relief personnel).
126. Id. § io.
127. As is the case in the five Peacekeeping Operations established by the Security Council in the
last two years and in the renewed Lebanese mission. See discussion supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
128. The treatment of civilians, of prisoners of war, and of the wounded and sick clearly extends
beyond the "active" engagement as combatant.
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conduct of hostilities, but with the treatment of non-combatants. 9 Thus,
these norms are applicable "in a situation" of armed conflict and not only
when an actual exchange of fire occurs.
IV. SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUTY TO OBSERVE INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW BY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
The UN is an international organization, not a sovereign State.
Because only States can sign the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the
UN is not a party to any humanitarian legal instrument.'30 However, since
most norms of international humanitarian law have achieved the status
of customary international law, it is almost unarguable that they should
be considered as binding upon all subjects of international society, which
would include sovereign States as well as the United Nations. 3'
Thus, consideration must be given to the issues of (I) whether
peacekeeping operations may find themselves in a situation in which the
laws of war are applicable, and (2) whether the intrinsic features of such
UN operations, as well as those of the Organization itself, make them
subject to the jurisdiction of international humanitarian law. The
adoption of the Secretary-General's Bulletin answers these two questions
in the positive, since it acknowledges both that peacekeepers may find
themselves in a situation in which they need to respect certain rules of
humanitarian law, and it assumes that the peacekeepers and the United
Nations are both capable of doing so. The Bulletin, however, leaves a
number of issues open, particularly whether it is a "complete" document
and, if not, whether peacekeeping operations need observe all norms of
international humanitarian law.
129. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 61 (each addressing the subject of non-
combatants).
130. The United Nations has the capacity to sign treaties, but it cannot sign the Geneva
Conventions or the Protocols because they are only open to sovereign "Powers." Tittemore, supra
note 17, at 95-96. As early as the x96os, some scholars argued extensively that the Geneva
Conventions were not open to international organizations since they were not "Powers" in the sense
generally attributed to this term ("Nation" or "State") in international law. See BOWETr, supra note i,
at 507-08; SIMMONDS, supra note 49, at 179-8o; see also Tittemore, supra note 17, at 96.
13 1. Most scholars mentioned in this Article argue that customary law on the matter is applicable,
mutatis mutandis, to the UN. See, e.g., BowETr, supra note I; SIMMONDS, supra note 51; see also Both6,
supra note 12, at 695 ("[Tihe UN is bound by general international law, the laws of war being no
exception."). The International Law Commission is currently examining the topic of the responsibility
of international organizations for breach of their international law obligations. Gen. Assembly, Int'l L.
Comm'n, Second Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations, A/CN.4/54 1 (Apr. 2,
2004) (prepared by Giorgio Gaja) [hereinafter Second Report]. In the research of the Special
Rapporteur, Giorgio Gaja, international humanitarian law is expressly mentioned as a source of
obligations for the UN. See id. 4.
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A. THE DUTY TO RESPECT AND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
The commitment to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva
Conventions is meant to emphasize that these treaties are not "an
engagement concluded on a basis of reciprocity," but rather "a series of
unilateral engagements solemnly contracted before the world."'32 In
order for the Geneva Conventions to apply, there must be a "declared
war or ... any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them."'33 The Conventions shall also apply "to all cases of
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance."'' The
Conventions thus apply whenever a situation of "armed conflict" exists
between two or more sovereign States, irrespective of a declaration of a
state of war, or how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes
place.'35 An armed conflict exists as a matter of fact,' 36 not of law, and
even without actual hostilities the Conventions may be applicable.
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions "refers to cases where the
occupation has taken place without a declaration of war and without
hostilities, and makes provision for the entry into force of the Convention
in those particular circumstances.""'' An occupation after a capitulation
or armistice also implicates the Conventions for "an armistice suspends
hostilities and a capitulation ends them, but neither ends the state of
war.
,, '38
Review of past and present practice of UN peacekeeping operations
shows that forces are mostly deployed in territories that fit the factual
situation required to trigger the Geneva and other humanitarian
conventions. Both in traditional "interposition" missions'39 and in more
132. INT'L COMM. OF RED. CROSS, COMMENTARY: THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION 25 (Jean Pictet ed.,
196o), available at http://www.icrc.orglihl.nsf/COM/365-57ooo4?OpenDocument [hereinafter
COMMENTARY I].
133. First Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 2.
134. Geneva Conventions, supra note 61, Common art. 2.
135. COMMENTARY I, supra note 132, at 28.
136. Glick, supra note 104, at 75.
137. INT'L COMM. OF RED. CROSS, COMMENTARY: THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION 21 (Jean Pictet
ed., 196o), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/38o-6oooo5?OpenDocument.
138. Id. at 22.
139. The fact that there are not actual hostilities in Cyprus or in the Middle East does not imply
that a situation of "war" has ceased to exist between the parties in those conflicts. Meanwhile, the
situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains "tense and potentially volatile" according to the UN
spokesman for UNMEE. Military Situation in Area Separating Ethiopia from Eritrea 'Potentially
Volatile' - UN, UN NEWS SERV., Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
storyAR.asp?NewsID= 17057&Cr=Ethiopia&CrI=Eritrea#. This is particularly true after Eritrea
expelled, and the Security Council agreed to withdraw, about 16o Western peacekeepers from its
border with Ethiopia. Warren Hoge, U.N. 's Western Peacekeepers To Be Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
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recent and complex ones, 4' blue helmets are usually deployed in places
where a "non-peaceful" situation actually exists. The fact that the
Security Council, more often than not, is using Chapter VII as legal basis
for the establishment of the operations may be considered as non-
conclusive evidence in that respect. 4' As is well known, under the UN
Charter the Security Council is in charge of "international peace and
security," and the Council may use different sources of authority to
secure it.' The fact that the Security Council opts for Chapter VII
proves that at least a "threat to the peace" exists. ' It is true that in the
sort of operations we are considering, peacekeepers are not "parties" to
the conflict under the Geneva Conventions." But if we accept that
armed troops, numbering several thousands' 45 and under responsible
military command,' 46 are deployed in a territory where international
humanitarian law is already applicable, and that the troops have a
mandate that in certain circumstances may compel them to use armed
force, then it is difficult to understand why the troops should not be
bound de jure by such body of law from the very beginning of their
mission, even before a single shot is fired.'47 The fact that the Bulletin is
only applicable to peacekeepers while they engage in hostilities means
that its scope is excessively narrow. This minimalist approach, however,
is consistent with the views of many scholars who claim that "although an
15, 2005, at A25; Marc Lacey, Eritrea Expels U.N. Peacekeepers, Increasing Tension With Ethiopia,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, at A5.
140. Clashes between Kosovo Albanians. and Serbs have been frequent since 1999, particularly
around the divided city of Mitrovica. Nebojsa Malic, Kosovo Burning, BALKAN ExPRESS, Mar. 20, 2004,
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=2 164.
141. As mentioned supra note 24, six out of the seven operations launched since 2ooo have a
reference to Chapter VII, the only exception being UNMEE. I accept that this is non-conclusive
evidence because the Security Council has in the past made a very flexible use of the expression
"threat to the peace" in Article 39 of the Charter, including situations that are far from amounting to
armed conflicts. U.N. Charter art. 39.
142. U.N. Charter chs. VI-VII.
L43. Chapter VII is activated when the Security Council "determines" the existence of a "threat to
the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression." U.N. Charter art. 39.
I44. See Glick, supra note 104, at 73 (criticizing the UN contention (articulated prior to the
issuance of the Bulletin) that it can never be "party to a conflict," and its soldiers may not be
considered to be "combatants").
145. The more recently established missions range between 2064 (UNMEE) and 54,434 (United
Nations Mission in Liberia) troops. Background Note, supra note 5. Currently, the largest operation,
the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), deploys 22,167 military
personnel. Id.
146. Glick, supra note 104, at 74 ("The term 'party to an armed conflict' is deemed to encompass
any de facto authority exercising command and control over military forces.").
147. Tittemore, supra note 17, at 107-o8 (arguing that UN forces are subject to the principles of
international humanitarian law only "to the extent that those forces are actively involved in
hostilities"). Tittemore seems to accept, though, that in any circumstance the UN "must recognize a
core of fundamental, nonderogable duties and protections comparable to those in Common Article 3,
its corresponding elaborating provisions in Protocol II, and the grave breach provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I." Id.
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armed conflict between other parties may take place at the same time,
[peacekeepers] enjoy the status of civilians.' ' ' . However, such a view fails
to fully take into account the factual characteristics of foreign troop
deployment in conflict areas, even when the troops are neutral and enjoy
the agreement of the parties. As discussed below,'49 the problem is not to
acknowledge their status as civilians insofar as we consider them from a
passive perspective, as persons worthy of protection, i.e., potential
victims of an attack by the parties. The issue only appears when they
engage in some sort of action-not necessarily the use of force-that may
implicate the rules of humanitarian law. At that point, the peacekeepers'
special, protected status should not lessen their obligation to comply with
those rules. They may be considered "civilians" worthy of special
protection, but at the same time, they are not mere passersby. They
belong to a public organization with a mandate involving actions in the
thin line between war and peace. This fact simply cannot be disregarded.
Even given the de jure duty of peacekeeping forces to observe
international humanitarian law, it must be acknowledged that the very
nature of the UN makes it impossible, or unlikely, for it to be bound by
certain humanitarian obligations, particularly those concerning domestic
action against breaches of the law committed by individuals. 5 ' Thus, the
"lack of a criminal or court system in the United Nations means that
even where an operation is conducted entirely under United Nations
command and control, certain obligations derived from IHL
[International Humanitarian Law] must be under the responsibility of
the contributing states and not of the United Nations.'' The Bulletin
acknowledges this fact when stating that in case of violations of
international humanitarian law, "members of the military personnel of a
United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national
courts.' ' '. The UN cannot fulfill, or breach, other provisions, but this
only confirms the fact that whenever and wherever international
148. Both6, supra note 12, at 695. Section i of the Bulletin also considers peacekeepers as "non-
combatants, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law
of armed conflict." The Bulletin, supra note 4, § 1.2.
149. See discussion infra Part IV.B on the 1994 Safety Convention and its implications for the
present discussion.
15o. The Geneva Conventions require parties "to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the present Convention." First Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 49; Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 61, art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 129; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 61, art. 146. Obviously, the UN cannot enact such legislation. The UN is not a
state and it does not possess a judiciary or a legislative power, much less a prison system of its own.
151. Greenwood, supra note i, at 27; see also Tittemore, supra note 17, at I i1 (adding that "at the
same time, [the UN] must also exercise some supervisory jurisdiction over such prosecutions in order
to maintain its own independence from the influence of individual member states").
152. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § 4; see also Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34; SOFA,
supra note 33.
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humanitarian law is applicable, it is also binding on UN peacekeeping
forces.'53 The following section expands briefly on this notion to try to
determine which humanitarian norms could be applicable to UN
operations beyond those listed in the Bulletin. The following examples
are a mere sampling from the vast body of norms of international
humanitarian law that the Bulletin fails to explicitly address.
i. Prisoners of War
In 1993 "UN Forces [in Somalia] detained hundreds of Somalis then
denied ICRC access to prisoners of war and persisted until ICRC
suspended all operations in protest."'54 The treatment of persons
detained in the course of peacekeeping operations has long been one of
the most controversial areas in discussions of the applicability of
international humanitarian law to peacekeeping. This is so because the
application of the Third Geneva Convention would seem to involve "a
degree of recognition of the status of the party which [the detainee]
served and his right to participate in combat."'55 It is probably for this
reason that the Bulletin only provides that "detained persons" shall be
treated in accordance "with the relevant provisions" of the Third Geneva
Convention, "as may be applicable to them mutatis mutandis.'', 6 The
Bulletin is cautious not to call these people "prisoners of war," though it
acknowledges that they may very well be so.' 7 The applicability of the
Third Geneva Convention to these detainees, even "with the necessary
changes," seems sufficient until we examine the specific examples set
forth by the Secretary-General., 8 The list of examples is too short and
seems to have the main purpose of responding to ICRC concerns about
the discharge of its mandate, while, at the same time, remaining
applicable to both civilian and military detainees.'59 Concerning the
latter, though, some very important norms from the Third Geneva
Convention are missing. The Bulletin contains no reference to the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, religious
153. As Pictet puts it, "as a matter of fact, there is an implicit clause in any law to the effect that no
one is obliged to do what is impossible." JEAN PIcTET, DEVELOPMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 88 (1985). He refers to "a genuine material impossibility." Id.
154. Roy Gutman, The United Nations and the Geneva Conventions, in CRIMES OF WAR 361, 364
(Roy Gutman & David Reif eds., 1999).
155. Greenwood, supra note I, at 29.
156. See discussion supra Part III.
157. It refers to detained persons "[w]ithout prejudice to their legal status." The Bulletin, supra
note 4, § 8.
158. See discussion supra Part III (describing notification to the ICRC, which shall have the right
to visit the detainees; safe and healthy premises; prohibition of torture and ill-treatment; and special
measures for women and children).
159. These particular obligations of the "Detaining Power" are found both in the Third (POW)
and Fourth (Civilians) Geneva Conventions. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 61; Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 61.
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belief, political opinion, language, social status,' 6' or to the duty to release
prisoners who are seriously wounded or sick. 6' Nor does the Bulletin set
forth the right of prisoners to disclose only their name, rank, date of
birth, and serial number in " 162 or the duty to inform the
detainees about the camp or center regulations and the limitations to the
ability to impose disciplinary measures for violations of such
regulations.,6 Clearly, the Bulletin is neither denying nor asserting the
UN's duty to comply with these and other provisions of the Third
Geneva Convention. However, given the discussion at the beginning of
this Part, whenever the detainee is a lawful-and it is up to the
competent authorities of the mission to make this decision' 64-the
Bulletin's reference to "the relevant provisions" of the Third Geneva
Convention, "as may be applicable to them mutatis mutandis" should be
understood in the widest possible sense, as encompassing all norms with
which the UN has the actual capacity to comply.
161
2. Occupation of Territories
In 1991, following the Paris Peace Accords that ended two decades
of internal struggle and foreign intervention, the Security Council
established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) with two components: "The military will be in charge of the
cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the demobilization of
the various combatants. The civil authorities, on the other hand, will be
responsible for Cambodian administrative structures, human rights, and
the refugee question.' ' 66 What distinguishes the Peace Plan from other
UN operations was that it provided that "United Nations itself (and
16o. However, positive discrimination on grounds of gender, rank, or age is admissible under the
Convention. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 16.
161. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 61, arts. iO9, I Io.
I62. Id. art. 17. The implication is that the UN has the right to interrogate prisoners of war
(detainees), obviously without coercion or outrages upon their dignity.
163. Id. arts. 89-98.
164. The UN must apply Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention to make such a determination.
See id. art. 4. In spite of the concerns raised by Greenwood, supra note I, at 35, there is no reason why
the commanding officers should not make this sort of decision, as they would in a State-led operation.
The only limitation would be whenever there are "doubts" about the status of the person and a
"competent tribunal" must decide. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 5. This is one of the
situations in which the UN cannot, because of its very nature, implement the rule on its own and must
rely on contributing States.
165. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § 8. This includes the right of prisoners to keep their personal
effects, the recognition of their rank, and the limitations to their use as labor, among many others.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 61, arts. I8, 43-45, 49-57. But not, for instance, the provisions
concerning "judicial proceedings," inasmuch as they refer to criminal prosecution for acts that are
forbidden "by the law of the Detaining Power" or by international law. Id. art. 99.
166. Sellarfs, supra note 12, at 129 ("El militar estarA encargado del alto el fuego, de la retirada de
las tropas extranjeras y de la desmovilizaci6n de los bandos combatientes. El componente civil, por su
parte, tendrfn como cometido la supervisi6n de las estructuras administrativas camboyanas, los
derechos humanos y la cuesti6n de los refugiados.").
February 20071
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
not... the warring parties, who could not agree on interim power-
sharing arrangements) [would] assure responsibility for the internal
administration of Cambodia during its transition to elected
government."' 67 The transition lasted for two years, during which the
United Nations was de jure and de facto the supreme authority of the
country." In 1999, the Cambodian experience was used to establish
temporary international administrations in the territories of Kosovo'
69
and East Timor.170
When the United Nations carries out complex and multidimensional
peacekeeping operations, such as those in Cambodia, East Timor, or
Kosovo, where the UN in fact replaces national authorities of the State
or territory, there seems to be room for considering whether the laws of
military occupation should apply. Occupation exists de facto when a
foreign power holds actual control and is the only authority in the
territory.' As noted above, this control does not need to derive from an
armed conflict. What is relevant is the actual submission of a territory
and its population to the authority of a foreign army'72 as long as this
presence is not approved by the authorities under whose sovereignty the
territory is placed.' This caveat is the most important element in
determining the applicability of the law of military occupation to the sort
of peacekeeping operations mentioned above.74 Since peacekeeping
operations are deployed after the adoption of an agreement between the
UN and the host State, or when the host State otherwise consents to this
deployment,'75 the de jure applicability of the law of military occupation
167. KEN BERRY, CAMBODIA FROM RED TO BLUE: AUSTRALIA'S INITIATIVE FOR PEACE 241 (1997).
168. United Nations, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, http://www.un.org/av/
photo/subjects/untac.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
169. S.C. Res. I244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1I244 (June io, 1999) (establishing UNMIK and authorizing
NATO forces (Kosovo Force (KFOR)) in the territory). UN forces are still present in Kosovo. See
Background Note, supra note 5.
170. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. SIRES/i2 7 2 (Oct. 25, 1999). The United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was a follow-up to an enforcement operation, the
International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), launched six weeks earlier after pro-integrationist
paramilitaries had engaged in widespread killing and looting following the outcome of the self-
determination consultation of Aug. 30, 1999. United Nations, UNTAET, http://www.un.org/peace/
etimor/UntaetB.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007) [hereinafter UNTAET]. UNTAET came to an end in
May 2002 once East Timor became a sovereign State. United Nations, Completed Peacekeeping
Operations, East Timor, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
171. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 6; Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. i8, 1907,36 Stat. 2277, 205 CONSOL. T.S. 277.
172. Sylvain Vitd, L'applicabilit6 de droit international de l'occupation militaire aux activit6s des
organisations internationales, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 9, 11 (2004).
173. Id. at I4; see also Adam Roberts, What is Military Occupation?, 55 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 300
(1984).
174. On the other hand, the de jure applicability of the law of military occupation in the context of
enforcement operations does not seem to raise any particular doubts, as long as the material
requirements of occupation effectively exist.
175. See discussion supra Part I.
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seems to be excluded. The problem is that, in practice, the consent of a
host State in a situation that requires such deep and extensive UN
presence may be null and void,'7" tainted, 77 or simply nonexistent. For
example, in East Timor, the establishment of UNTAET in October 1999
followed the ousting of Indonesian forces and paramilitaries by a
Chapter VII enforcement operation (INTERFET).7 8 There was no
"power" in the territory, and even if Indonesia had agreed on the
deployment of INTERFET, its consent was completely irrelevant from a
legal point of view: first, a Chapter VII operation does not need the
agreement of the State against which it is addressed; second, Indonesia
had never been recognized as sovereign over the territory.'
79
In these circumstances, an "occupation" should be deemed to exist if
all other requirements are met.'8° And even if the case for a de jure
application of international humanitarian law might be hard to
construct,' 8' there would be grounds to claim its de facto application, at
176. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) "consented" to the deployment of UNMIK (and
KFOR) in Kosovo on June 3, 1999, six days before surrendering to the NATO commander and while
still under air attacks. Vit6, supra note 172, at 23.
177. The peace process that led to the Paris Conference and Accords in 1991 was led by Australia
and imposed by the five permanent members of the Security Council once they had reached an
agreement among themselves. As Sellards explains:
Aunque nominalmente sea Camboya soberanamente quien resuelva el conflicto, en
realidad la soluci6n ha sido dictada por los 5 miembros permanentes.... Es una soluci6n
impuesta, sin alteraciones o cambios sustanciales.
Este dirigismo de los permanentes es tan evidente que reiteran hasta tres veces el
llamamiento a que las partes camboyanas creen el Consejo Nacional Supremo, y cuando
6ste exista "deberi reanudarse la Conferencia de Paris", para la que fija una "tarea" o
"deber": "un plan detallado para la puesta en prActica de conformidad con ese marco", el
marco acordado por Francia, Gran Bretafia, China, Estados Unidos y la Uni6n Sovidtica.
SELLARfS, supra note 12, at 111-12 ("Although in theory Cambodia was to solve the conflict as a
sovereign power, the solution, in fact, was dictated by the five permanent members [of the Security
Council]. It was an imposed solution, [to be implemented] without substantive changes. The power of
the permanent members was so evident that they reiterated at least three times their call to the
Cambodian parties to establish the Supreme National Council and to reinstate the Paris talks, where
the parties were to dutifully put into place the framework decided by France, Great Britain, China, the
United States, and the Soviet Union.").
178. AMNESTY INT'L, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING
INVESTIGATIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES IN EAST TIMOR I (1999),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA2 1186i9 9 9 ENGLISH/$File/ASA21 18699.pdf; UNTAET,
supra note 170.
179. See SAURA, supra note 13, at 46; Vit6, supra note 172, at 28.
18o. In Kosovo, the military and civil authorities running the territory are split between KFOR, a
Chapter VII operation led by NATO, and UNMIK, a peacekeeping operation without any troops.
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I244 (June io, 1999); United Nations, UNMIK at a Glance,
http://www.unmikontine.org/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). Thus, even if the situation on the
ground can be considered equivalent to military occupation in this case, the duty to observe the Fourth
Geneva Convention and other relevant norms belongs to the States acting under KFOR and not to the
UN.
181. The largest UN peacekeeping operation ever, UNTAC in Cambodia, involved the
deployment of roughly eighteen thousand military personnel. United Nations, UNTAC, Facts and
Figures, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co-mission/untacfacts.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
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least in those areas where this body of law broadly coincides with
international human rights law. As Meron explains, "to the extent that
the Fourth Geneva Convention cannot adequately resolve the problems
of modern occupation.., the applicable human rights protection should
be invoked to fill the void. ''"2
Setting aside the core human-rights aspects of international
humanitarian law, most authors tend to think that "when a United
Nations force is involved in administering territory but has not been a
party to an international armed conflict," the law of belligerent
occupation is inapplicable.' 83 Instead, they argue "the Charter itself
imposes obligations that may stop Member States whose territor the
Force is occupying from claiming the treatment of the laws of war"' and
that the Security Council "may override customary international law in
the same manner as treaty law,"' 85 including international humanitarian
law.'8 6 Such bold assertions cannot be accepted. It is true that the
International Court of Justice has held that UN Members "are obliged to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with Article 25 of the Charter" and that, in doing so "in accordance with
Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the parties in that respect
prevail over their obligations under any other international
agreement." '87 But it must be noted that the dispute in that case referred
to the 1971 Montreal Convention, which established obligations that are
purely treaty-based and are not based on customary international law,
and much less peremptory. This is a very different situation from the
Compare this figure with the 16o,ooo deployed in occupied Iraq since May 2003 and the situation in
both countries. STEVE BOWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, IRAQ: U.S.
MILITARY OPERATIONS 5 (2oo6), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL317oI.pdf.
Obviously, without some sort of real support/agreement of the "parties" in Cambodia, the UN
presence would have been unsustainable.
182. Meron, supra note 55, at 266; see also Luigi Condorelli, Le statut des forces de l'ONU et le
droit international humanitaire, 78 RIVISTA Di DIRIrrO INTERNAZIONALE 4 (1995). The same arguments
that we have used for international humanitarian law, i.e., that it is customary and generally
applicable, including for international organizations in the appropriate circumstances, apply to the
international protection of human rights. And since this body of law does not cease to apply in times
of war (except when derogation is allowed and exercised), the elements of the law of occupation, and
particularly the treatment of civilians, that are common to general customary law of human rights are
mandatory for peacekeeping operations.
183. Greenwood, supra note i, at 3o; see also BOWETr, supra note I, at 490 (stating that when the
jurisdiction of a peacekeeping force is grounded on Status of Forces agreement between the
Organization and the host State, it does not operate as a belligerent occupier).
184. BOWETT, supra note I, at 491.
185. Tittemore, supra note 17, at ioi.
186. Greenwood, supra note I, at 28 (stating that in case of occupation by the UN (or by States
with the authorization of the UN), "the law of belligerent occupation would apply but only unless and
until the Security Council used its Chapter VII powers to impose a different regime as part of the
measures which it considered necessary for the restoration of peace and security").
187. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3. 15 (Apr. 14).
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Geneva Conventions and Protocols, inasmuch as most of their rules are
customary in nature and in many respects may be considered jus
cogens.' Moreover, with respect to the Montreal Convention, the ICJ
later held that it could not declare Libya's request inadmissible without
looking into the merits of the case, only because of the existence of two
Security Council resolutions,'89 thus questioning whether Security
Council resolutions can actually or would necessarily override treaty
obligations. Condorelli is therefore correct when he states that the
Security Council does not have the authority to rule against international
humanitarian law.'"
We now turn to the applicability of the law of occupation to UN
missions, for this will, in fact, determine the exact extent of UN rights
and duties in the occupied territory, beyond the particular mandate of
the Security Council and the terms of the Secretary-General's Bulletin.
In this respect, a number of provisions in the relevant Hague and Geneva
Conventions are clearly inapplicable to an operation led by a non-State
entity. For example, the UN cannot "transfer ... its own civilian
population"' 9 ' in order to change the demographic composition of the
occupied territory. Moreover, while the UN should not "compel"
protected persons to serve in its armed or "auxiliary forces," there is no
good reason why it should not publicize the possibility of a voluntary
engagement. 92 On the other hand, most other norms seem to be perfectly
applicable to the UN: foreigners in the occupied territory must be
188. See discussion supra Part II.
189. The ICJ stated:
However, by requesting such a decision, the United Kingdom is requesting, in reality, at
least two others which the decision not to proceed to judgment on the merits would
necessarily postulate: on the one hand a decision establishing that the rights claimed by
Libya under the Montreal Convention are incompatible with its obligations under the
Security Council resolutions; and, on the other hand, a decision that those obligations
prevail over those rights by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter.
The ICJ was thus not ready to determine, without further consideration, that Security Council
resolutions would completely supersede pre-existing treaty law and that this was necessarily a legal
consequence of such resolutions. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1998
I.C.J. 9, 29 (Feb. 27).
19o. Condorelli, supra note 182, at 898. In my view, the binding nature of these resolutions does
not necessarily imply that they supersede or eliminate in toto the whole of International Law. First.
the Security Council cannot impose duties that are contrary to peremptory norms of general
international law; and, second, as long as they are not incompatible with the Council's determination,
other rules of international law remain binding. Thus, the Security Council does not need to recall for
each operation the duty of peacekeepers to respect, for instance, the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State or States where they are acting. It is a given. The same happens with
international humanitarian law.
191. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 49. The UN does not have the capacity to
breach the prohibition for it does not possess "population" of its own.
192. Id. art. 5 I() ("The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed
or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is
permitted." (emphasis added)).
February 20071
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
allowed to leave it;'93 individual or mass forcible transfers are
forbidden; 94 the Occupying Power must restrain from measures aiming at
creating unemployment;'95 it must also abstain from any destruction of
real or personal property belonging to individuals or the State;I96 it may
not alter the status of public officials or judges in the occupied
territories; '97 it must permit ministers of religion to give spiritual
assistance to the members of their religious communities;' 9 and so forth.
Fears that these constraints may hamper the mission are unfounded
because most of these obligations are far from absolute. They are worded
in a manner that takes into account "military necessity." In the case of
peacekeeping operations, the reasonable contrary commands of the
Security Council, due to functional necessity, need not be interpreted as
incompatible with them. For instance, even if "the penal laws of the
occupied territory shall remain in force" they "may be repealed or
suspended.., where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle
to the application of the present Convention.' 9  Thus, UN
administrations that change domestic laws that are incompatible with the
UN's mandate would not necessarily be a breach of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. °" Rather than seeing the duty of peacekeeping operations to
observe the Fourth Geneva Convention as a "problem," one could argue
that the problem is that the Convention is insufficient, and that its
provisions need to be supplemented by other relevant and applicable
international norms, particularly those regarding human rights."'
3. The Duty "To Ensure Respect"
During the Bosnian War, an oft-cited episode occurred in which
officials of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had to
decide whether they had a "duty to intervene" to defend the inviolability
of a hospital under attack by Serbian troops in the safe area of Biha6.
They did so, although later that year the UN Office of Legal Affairs
stated that such action did not amount to a precedent and that
193. Id. art. 48.
194. Id. art. 49.
195. Id. art. 52.
196. Id. art. 53.
197. Id. art. 54.
198. Id. art. 58.
199. Id. art. 64 ("The Occupying Power may... subject the population of the occupied territory to
provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power... to maintain the orderly government
of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power ....").
2oo. For instance, the seventy-five regulations adopted by UNTAET during the two and a half
years of its administration of East Timor (I999-2oo2) were a minimum set of necessary rules to govern
a lawless, devastated territory. See United Nations, UNTAET, News and Developments,
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetN.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
201. Application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN-
Mandated Forces, Report on the Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations, 86 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 205, 210 (2004).
[VOL. 58:479
LA WFUL PEACEKEEPING
peacekeepers were only bound by Security Council resolutions, not by
the Geneva Conventions,"2 as if both sources of legal obligations were
mutually exclusive." It should come as no surprise, then, that the only
reference to a duty to ensure respect of international humanitarian law
found in the Secretary-General's Bulletin is the duty to protect in all
circumstances medical and religious personnel, as well as transports,
medical equipment. and units. 4
The remaining issue is whether UN peacekeeping operations also
have a duty to intervene to "ensure respect" whenever they witness or
learn of violations of international humanitarian obligations by the
parties in the conflict. As discussed above, the meaning of the "ensure
respect" clause in Common Article I to the four Geneva Conventions"5
has expanded, and it is now widely understood-including by the ICJ-
to encompass a duty to intervene. As the ICRC explains in its comments
to the Geneva Conventions, "in the event of a Power failing to fulfill its
obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may,
and should, endeavor to bring it back to an attitude of respect of the
Convention. ' " 6 Likewise, even though the UN is not a "contracting
Party" to the Convention, it still must comply with the customary duty to
ensure respect for international humanitarian norms.0 7 Professor
Greenwood, thus, is incorrect when he qualifies the alleged legal duty of
the UN to take such action as "unsound" on the grounds that the terms
of that provision would be "asked to bear a weight which they were
never intended to carry and which has never been acknowledged in state
practice. ''28 In fact, he rightly points out that the obligation faces
"considerable practical difficulties," particularly because the blue
202. Gutman, supra note 154, at 361; MURPHY, supra note 30, at 176 (noting the inconsistency in
the attitude of the UN, since his interviews show that UNIFIL did monitor the behavior of Israeli
forces in Lebanon after the 5982 invasion).
203. As mentioned above supra note 182, it goes without saying that UN Operations have to fulfill
the mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council under the resolution establishing them, but
that does not mean that the rest of international law ceases to apply. Thus, the only relevant issue
concerning the "duty to ensure respect" is to determine its legal implications in general, both for
States and the UN, irrespective of the mandates provided by the Security Council.
204. The Bulletin, supra note 4, §§ 9.4-9.5.
205. See discussion supra Part II.
206. COMMENTARY I, supra note 532, at 26.
207. As the ICJ has pointed out in relation to Israel's violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
the Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and
the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime, taking
due account of the present Advisory Opinion.
Construction of a Wall, supra note 57, 16o (emphasis added). Note that the Court is not asking the
Security Council to use Chapter VII of the Charter. The duty to ensure respect encompasses any
useful diplomatic, economic, political action towards the end of stopping the violation of the
Conventions.
208. Greenwood, supra note t, at 32-33.
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helmets may "not [be] equipped for an operation of that kind."2" But
such concern derives from a narrow understanding of the duty to
intervene, as including only an armed or coercive intervention meant to
stop an on-going violation of the Conventions. As Greenwood suggests,
this would only be feasible when the peacekeepers are capable of
undertaking such action with minimum guarantees of success.1 ° But just
as we do not require all States to react in the same manner to a violation
of international humanitarian law, the duty to ensure respect by UN
peacekeeping operations must be understood within the framework of
their strength and features. For instance, as Palwankar notes, one way to
comply with the duty to ensure respect of the Conventions would simply
be "to draw up reports on violations of [international humanitarian law]
in the sectors where the [peacekeeping forces] are deployed .....
Likewise, Domfnguez mentions that the duty to ensure respect implies
that all states must take the measures they feel appropriate with respect to
any other state that fails to observe those duties."' Thus, "it may be
argued that a United Nations force has a duty to take action against
violations of international humanitarian law by others, regardless of
whether it is itself a party to an armed conflict,.2.3 as a general obligation
under international law. Even if the measures adopted by the force are
only diplomatic and non-coercive, this may seem to compromise the
"impartiality" of the Operation or of the UN,214 "[blut if the policy
adopted by the United Nations is applied in a consistent and impartial
manner, this argument may be rebutted. 2 i. In any case, this is a
characteristic of peacekeeping that is worth renouncing for the sake of
ensuring respect for international humanitarian norms."
209. Id. at 33.
210. Id. More often than not, peacekeepers carry only light weaponry, unfit for any sustained
enforcement action. In this respect, paragraph 12 of Resolution 1701 (2oo6) authorizes UNIFIL troops
to use all necessary action, among other things, "to protect United Nations personnel, facilities,
installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations
personnel, humanitarian workers and.., to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence." S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 24, 52. But this authorization is conditioned "as it deems within
its capabilities." Id. In other words, no one should expect peacekeepers to do more than they can
materially do.
211. Palwankar, supra note 18, at 236.
212. DOMfNGUEZ, supra note 71, at 381: "Todos los Estados se encuentran con el deber de tomar
las medidas que crean oportunas respecto de cualquier otro Estado que no respete ese deber."
213. KNooPs, supra note 45, at 81-82.
214. This was the second practical concern of Greenwood, supra note i, at 33.
215. Murphy, supra note 30, at 179. He adds that "it cannot be right to allow a United Nations
force to stand idly by in circumstances where breaches of humanitarian law are taking place in their
area of operations." Id.
216. The agreement given by the parties as a pre-condition for the deployment of the operation
should not be understood as a blank check given by the UN to any unlawful action in which the parties
may engage afterwards.
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4. Non-International Armed Conflicts
Most peacekeeping operations, especially since the first surge in
international peacekeeping in the late I98os, take place within the
boundaries of a single State."' Since 2000, only one out of seven new
peacekeeping operations, the one dealing with the supervision of the
cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea, has a purely international
character. The rest take place, or have taken place within the borders of
the sovereign states of East Timor, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Burundi,
and Sudan."" In these circumstances, the question arises whether only
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are applicable to UN
troops or whether the presence of UN troops renders the conflict
automatically international in nature."9 In a sense, the silence of the
Secretary-General's Bulletin in this respect is reassuring:2. it means that
the Bulletin's rules apply regardless of the international or non-
international nature of the armed conflict in which the peacekeeping
mission takes place. The Secretary-General is thus ordering its troops to
comply with this set of norms. Nevertheless, because the Bulletin is not a
complete document, we need to ascertain (I) whether by deploying
peacekeeping troops in a non-international armed conflict,2 ' the UN's
presence turns the conflict into an international one, thus making the
whole body of international humanitarian law applicable to the parties
and to the UN forces; or (2) whether UN forces must always comply with
the norms of international armed conflicts regardless of the nature of the
conflict.
Initially, even if it is only because of the "multinational nature of
U.N. forces, ...... it is difficult to see how hostilities in which the [UN] is
involved can be regarded as 'not of an international character.' 2 3 The
practice of the UN, though, is not fully consistent with this view. In the
Congo operation, "[t]he United Nations considered itself to be bound
(and to benefit from) the entire body of the Geneva Conventions and not
217. See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping, http:l/www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/
index.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (follow "Past Operations" hyperlink).
218. See Background Note, supra note 5.
219. Murphy, supra note 30, at 163 ("If a conflict can be regarded as international in character,
then the whole ius in bello of the Geneva Conventions (more than 400 provisions) apply. However, the
protection afforded under common article 3 and Protocol II governing non-international armed
conflicts is much more limited in scope.").
220. The Bulletin, supra note 4, § I (noting its "Field of application" does not contain a single
reference to the international or non-international nature of the conflict where UN enforcement or
peacekeeping actions are undertaken).
221. Murphy, supra note 30, at i63-64 (noting correctly that "[d]istinguishing between
international and non-international armed conflict in contemporary situations remains difficult, and
this is evidenced by the contradictory decisions of the different chambers of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the nature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia").
222. Tittemore, supra note 17, at I io.
223. BOWETr, supra note i, at 509.
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just common Article 3 ... in Somalia [it] did not regard [it]self as part[y]
to an international armed conflict.12 4 Greenwood supports this change of
attitude on the grounds that since the Somali factions "did not possess
the military, political or judicial organization of a state... [,] to have
maintained that both sides were obliged to apply the Prisoners of War
Convention would have had an air of unreality."2"5 Likewise, Tittemore is
ready to accept that in a non-international setting, UN forces are bound
"to the law governing international armed conflict vis-d-vis the organized
armed forces of other States," but "in conflicts that would be considered
domestic without U.N. involvement, the United Nations would be bound
only by the law governing domestic armed conflicts, with respect to non-
state actors involved.
'2 6
These approaches rely heavily on the need for "reciprocity" and
"equality" between the parties in the conflict as an underlying essential
principle of international humanitarian law." This implies the
equalization of parties who are not, in fact, equal. Glick has rightly
criticized such approach on the basis of the applicability of the jus ad
bellum argument. If, as he contends, "the boundaries of the jus ad bellum
manifest the jurisdictional boundaries between civil war and
international conflict ' '228 and "[w]hen the United Nations intervenes in a
civil war, it is the jus ad bellum that prescribes and delimits the right of
the Organization to engage in armed conflict with rebel forces" ' 9 then
"U.N. conflicts with rebel forces are 'international' in character, despite
the fact that the 'two subjects of international law' test might suggest
otherwise.""23 A similar argument is used by Professor Oeter to conclude
that "with the intervention of third states the conflict becomes
'internationalized,' and in the relation between the intervening third
states and the armed organizations participating in the civil war the
entire complex of the laws of international armed conflict becomes
applicable." 3'
224. Greenwood, supra note I, at 26; see also BowErr, supra note I, at 509 (discussing MONUC).
225. Greenwood, supra note I.
226. Tittemore, supra note 17, at iio (emphasis added). He further argues that in internal armed
conflicts, the United Nations would not have to afford prisoner of war status to captured combatants.
Id. at iII.
227. U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, AIR
FORCE PAMPHLET 110-34, 91 (i980), cited in GREEN, supra note 65, at 347 ("The law of armed conflict
applies equally to both sides in all international wars or armed conflicts. This is true even if one side is
guilty of waging an illegal or aggressive war .... Even forces acting under the sanction of the United
Nations... are required to follow the law of armed conflict in dealing with the enemy.").
228. Glick, supra note 104, at 88.
229. Id. at 89.
230. Id. at 9. Although Glick does not differentiate them, in my opinion this argument only
functions properly in enforcement operations, not in peacekeeping ones.
231. Stefan Oeter, Civil War, Humanitarian Law and the United Nations, I MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK
OF UNITED NATIONs LAW 221 (1997).
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It may be unrealistic or unfeasible to ask non-State actors, or even
governmental actors in their relationship with rebel forces, to comply
with the Geneva Conventions, with or without UN involvement. In fact,
since some of the conflicts where peacekeepers are being deployed take
place in so-called "failed States, 23. only Common Article 3, rather than
Protocol II, is applicable to the parties.33 Thus, the presence of
international peace troops does not change the nature of the conflict for
the parties in their mutual relations. But this is irrelevant as to their
relationship with the UN. The parties, governmental or non-state, are
bound to respect and protect UN troops, not because of the rules of
international humanitarian law, but because of the 1994 Safety
Convention. 34 The UN is not treated as an "equal" party because it is
not. Likewise, if we accept that international humanitarian law is
applicable, then it only makes sense that the UN observe the norms that
rule international armed conflicts, even if such rules are not binding
between the parties in the conflict. The original non-international
character of the conflict should not be an excuse for the UN to avoid
compliance "in all circumstances" with those rules.3
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1994 CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF UNITED
NATIONS AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL
Following a considerable escalation in the amount and intensity of
attacks against peacekeeping personnel in the early I99Os,3 6 the General
232. Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Haiti were in a situation of complete anarchy and devastation
before a peace agreement asking for the deployment of blue helmets was reached. United Nations,
MINUCI Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html (last visited
Jan. 4, 2007); United Nations, UNOMIL Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/co mission/unomilFT.htm#AUGUST (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); United Nations, UNMIH
Background, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co-mission/unmihbackgr2.html (last visited Jan. 4,
2007). In spite of such agreements, the situation and the provisional governments in these countries
remain fragile, and warring factions are still powerful actors.
233. Common Article 3, referring to non-international armed conflicts is meant to complete
Common Article 2 and makes the Geneva Convention all-inclusive. Third Geneva Convention, supra
note 61, art. 3. Thus any "armed conflict" that does not fit in Article 2 must be understood to be
regulated by Article 3. But Article I of Protocol II sets a definition of "non-international armed
conflict" that is much more demanding. It requires the conflict to take place between the armed forces
of the State and dissident armed forces; such dissident forces being under responsible command,
exercising control over a part of the territory of the State, being capable of carrying out sustained and
concerted military operations and implementing the Protocol, etc. See Protocol II, supra note 62, art. 1.
The practical result is that it excludes from its scope of application de-structured, non-international
conflicts such as those mentioned in the above note where governmental forces have disappeared from
the scene or where rebel groups do not meet all the conditions set up in the Protocol.
234. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
235. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
236. Since its very first missions, the UN has suffered the loss of human lives, though more often
than not this was due to incidental rather than direct action against its personnel. As explained by
Bouvier, though, "Since the early 199os, the situation has radically changed and risks to life and limb
of personnel engaged by the [UNI ha[ve] greatly increased.., nowadays United Nations personnel are
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Assembly adopted the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel on December 9, 1994 ("Safety Convention").237
The Safety Convention "was negotiated in three separate sessions at the
[UN] in New York during 1994, a particularly fast pace for an instrument
of some complexity and political sensitivity. '238 The goal of the Safety
Convention "is to protect United Nations and associated personnel from
becoming the object of attack by purporting to criminalize [sic] attacks
by other armed forces on peacekeeping troops." '39  The Safety
Convention states that the UN and its "associated personnel, their
equipment and premises shall not be made the object of attack or any
action that prevents them from discharging their mandate." 40 The Safety
Convention then compels states to establish as crimes under their
national law a number of offenses that contravene this prohibition
(murder, kidnapping, violent attacks, etc.)Y4' The Safety Convention also
compels States to establish jurisdiction for those crimes in at least in two
circumstances,242 and allows them to do so on three additional grounds.243
In order to ensure that alleged offenders are actually brought to justice,
the Safety Convention operates as an extradition agreement among
States that do not have such agreements already in place, or when the
existing agreement does not contemplate the crimes mentioned in article
924 Because this may not be enough to guarantee prosecution in all
cases, the Safety Convention also establishes a principle of universal
jurisdiction: whenever a petition of extradition is addressed to the State
that has jurisdiction over the offender, such State must either grant the
petition or prosecute the offender.245 In this respect, the Safety
often deliberately attacked with the sole aim of paralyzing the operation in which they are engaged."
Antoine Bouvier, "Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel":
Presentation and Analysis, 309 INT'L REV. RED CROss 639, 640 (1994). He adds that by 1994, out of a
total of 1074 dead in all past and ongoing missions by UN military contingents, 202 military personnel
were killed in 1993 alone. Id.
237. Safety Convention, supra note 96. It currently has eighty-one State parties. United Nations,
Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel, http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treaty8.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
238. Evan Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 621 (1995). For an account of the origin and negotiating
history of the Safety Convention, see Bouvier, supra note 236.
239. Murphy, supra note 3o, at i81.
240. Safety Convention, supra note 96, art. 7.1. State parties also have the duty to cooperate in the
prevention of crimes against UN personnel. Id. art. i i.
241. Id. art. 9.
242. When the crime is committed in its territory or by a national of the State. Id. art. Io.t.
243. "[W]hen it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or with
respect of a national of that State; or in an attempt to compel that State to do or to abstain from doing
any act." Id. art. 10.2.
244. Id. art. 15.
245. The aut dedere aut judicare clause in Article 14 of the Safety Convention is completed by
Article 10.4, according to which "[ejach State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set out in article 9 in cases where the alleged offender is
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Convention follows the same rationale and structure as the different
conventions against terrorism adopted under the aegis of the UN and
specialized agencies in the last thirty years. 246 A few years after the
adoption of the Safety Convention, the Statute of the International
Criminal Court has acknowledged that the following are war crimes:
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units of vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians
or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.'47
As the last sentence of this provision suggests, the protective regime
described above is not applicable to any action attributable to the UN.
The Safety Convention defines UN personnel as "[p]ersons engaged or
deployed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as members of
the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations
operation ;,,8 an operation which, in turn, is defined as "established by
the competent organ of the United Nations in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and conducted under United Nations
authority and control" in order, inter alia, to maintain or restore
"international peace and security." '49 This structure and purpose of the
mission indicates that the Safety Convention aims at the protection of
present in its territory and it does not extradite such person pursuant to article 15." Id. art. 10.4. Thus,
if a State is not ready to extradite an alleged offender but has no link with the crime in the terms of
paragraphs I and 2 of Article Io, it will need to base its competence on the principle of universal
jurisdiction.
246. In these treaties
parties must cooperate in the criminal and jurisdictional field to facilitate the punishment of
those guilty of the crimes specifically mentioned in each treaty. In particular, they must
incorporate that concrete conduct and appropriate foreseeable punishment into their
criminal code. Then, parties must either prosecute or extradite the person that happens to be
under their jurisdiction who is suspected of having committed this act in the territory of
another party.
Jaume Saura, Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against Terrorism in Contemporary International
Law and the Role of the Security Council, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 7, 11 (2OO4) (citing
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, i999, S. TREATY
Doc. No. io6-49, 39 I.L.M. 270; LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 404,405 (4 th ed. 2001)).
247- Rome Statute, supra note 78, art. 8(b)(iii). In its Resolution 1502 of August 26, 2003, the
Security Council reaffirmed the war crime nature of these attacks when committed in situations of
armed conflict. S.C. Res. 1502, U.N. Doc. S/RES/15o2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
248. Safety Convention, supra note 96, art. I(a)(i) (emphasis added).
249. Id. art. i(c)(i) (emphasis added). The other ground of applicability of the Convention is
whenever "there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of the personnel participating in the
operation." Id. art. i(c)(ii). Since this risk has to be expressly stated by the Security Council or the
General Assembly, this declaration would objectify and solve any concerns as to the applicability of
the Convention for that particular case. An Optional Protocol to the Convention adopted on
December 8, 2005, not yet in force, expands the field of application to other operations under UN
authority and control for the purpose of delivering humanitarian, political, or development assistance
in peacebuilding, or delivering emergency humanitarian assistance. G.A. Res. 6o/42, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/6o/4 2 (Jan. 6, 2006).
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blue helmets. 5' In order to make things even clearer, article 2(2)
formalizes a specific exclusion from the scope of application of the
Treaty in the following terms:
This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation
authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the
personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces
and to which the law of international armed conflicts applies."'
This clause, and particularly the reference to international
humanitarian law, has raised the issue of the eventual contradiction
between the establishment of a privileged regime for UN troops (and
other personnel), on the one hand, and their duty to comply with
international humanitarian law, on the other. Some scholars have gone
so far as to state that the legal regime of the Safety Convention and the
laws of war are "mutually exclusive," in the sense that "[t]he threshold
for the application of the law of international armed conflict thus
becomes the ceiling for the application of the Convention25' or that the
Safety Convention regime applies "to non-conflict situations," whereas
international humanitarian law applies "to any situation of sufficient
degree of conflict." '253 This may be so, but only if we read the Safety
Convention from the point of view of the parties to the conflict and their
duties towards peacekeepers, not from the perspective of the duties of the
UN and the mission towards the parties and others in the conflict.
There is no doubt whatsoever about the need for a protective regime
for UN personnel engaged in peacekeeping operations. More than a
decade after the adoption of the Safety Convention, the Secretary-
General noted in his report of August 12, 2005 that in the previous year,
"United Nations personnel deployed globally in a broad range of field
operations continued to be subjected to threats such as hostage-taking,
physical assault, robbery, theft, harassment, and detention." '254 The Safety
Convention may not be a perfect instrument, but it does add clarification
and protection to the pre-existing regime, and it establishes a
comprehensive network of competent jurisdictions.255 What the Safety
250. See Letter of Submittal on the Safety Convention to the United States Senate, Nov. 8, 2000, S.
TREATY Doc. No. lo7-i, at VII (2001) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal] ("These individuals are
commonly known as 'blue-hats."'). It goes on to say that the Convention also covers forces and certain
other personnel associated with a UN operation in support of the fulfillment of the mandate of the
UN. Id. at VIII.
251. Safety Convention, supra note 96, art. 2(2).
252. Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 185, 197-98; see also Greenwood, supra note i, at 25.
253. Murphy, supra note 30, at 186.
254. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Safety and Security of
Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel, 4, U.N. Doc. A/6o/223 (Aug.
12, 2005).
255. Thus, I believe that certain criticisms are greatly exaggerated. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note
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Convention does not do is alter the duties of peacekeepers in
international law and, in this respect, any interpretation of it as being
inherently incompatible with international humanitarian law arises from
a misreading of article 2(2), which addresses the conduct of the parties in
the conflict, not that of UN troops.
The sole purpose of article 2(2) is to clarify that the Safety
Convention does not operate in enforcement operations and does not
protect the personnel engaged in such operations. Article 2(2) explains
to the parties fighting against UN-authorized troops"'6 that they must still
comply with the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols. This duty applies irrespective of the conduct of UN troops in
either enforcement or peacekeeping operations. In the latter case, there
are no reasonable grounds for thinking that the Safety Convention
should not be applicable. Therefore, respect for UN personnel must be
mandatory on all parties in the conflict. Furthermore, UN peacekeeping
troops are obliged to comply with the norms of international
humanitarian law, including those relating to prisoners of war and
civilians that do not entail an actual conduct of hostilities.257
Two further provisions of the Safety Convention clarify this point.
First, article 6 provides that, without prejudice of their privileges and
immunities, UN personnel shall "[r]espect the laws and regulations of the
host State.' '118 Such laws and regulations must be understood to include
the main international humanitarian treaties and regulations, which are
nowadays universally accepted. Second, and foremost, the savings clause
in article 20(a) states that nothing in the Safety Convention shall affect
"[t]he applicability of international humanitarian law and universally
recognized standards of human rights.., in relation to the protection of
United Nations operations.., and personnel or the responsibility of such
personnel to respect such law and standards."'59 It is worth noting that
these are the only two articles that mention the duties of UN personnel,
and they clearly "[leave] room for conjecture whether humanitarian law
may be applicable when the Convention itself applies. ' '6 Or, as the State
3o, at 187 ("[T]he Convention is a poorly drafted and ill-thought out document that was heavily
influenced by political factors.").
256. In Chapter VII operations, even if authorized by the Security Council, the troops remain fully
and only under the command and control of participating States.
257. See Bloom, supra note 238, at 625 (acknowledging an overlap between the Safety Convention
and international humanitarian law-attacks against peace-keepers are criminalized under the
Convention; if such attacks lead to a certain level of combat that makes international humanitarian
law applicable, then attacks will be at the same time criminal and subject to the rules applicable to
combatants in international armed conflicts).
258. Safety Convention, supra note 96, art. 6.
259. Id. art. 20(a) (emphasis added).
260. Bouvier, supra note 236, at 663. He considers not only the text of the Convention, but also the
negotiations leading to it to reach this conclusion, including the finding that even if the material scope
of application of the Convention is distinct from that of international humanitarian law, they both
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Department puts it, "[t]his clause recognizes that the Convention is not
intended to alter the existing application of humanitarian and human
rights law."
26
This conclusion should not come as a surprise. Prior to the adoption
of the Safety Convention, "the Command and personnel of the Force
were entitled to the privileges and immunities granted by Article 105 of
the Charter, as supplemented by the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations. ',' 2 The UN did not consider such
action to be incompatible with the duty to respect the "principles and
spirit of the general international Conventions applicable to the conduct
of military personnel. ' '263 True, the sacrosanct principle of equality
between the warring parties is altered.264 But this is simply because the
"parties" are not equal given that UN peacekeeping forces are not
"warring parties" in the first place. 65 They are deployed on a consensual
mission and will only use force in self-defense or to carry out their
mission. They are worthy of special treatment even if they engage in the
use of armed force. But if they do use force, or, if they find themselves in
actual armed conflict, their special status does not absolve them of a duty
to comply with the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.
At the same time, and again from the perspective of the other parties in
the conflict, the savings clause "felicitously supplements the exclusion in
Article 2(2) of the Convention by guaranteeing that whenever the
Convention proves insufficient to ensure the protection of United
Nations and associated personnel, international humanitarian law should
take effect. ''26
C. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATION OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW BY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
We now turn to the question of the degree of responsibility that the
UN assumes, as an international legal person, when a peacekeeping
operation infringes the rules of international humanitarian law. As
explained earlier, peacekeeping contingents are provided on an ad hoc
basis by contributing States, but are put under the command and control
of the UN. 67 In effect, unlike Chapter VII operations, which are
overlap. Id.
26r. Letter of Submittal, supra note 250, at XI.
262. See BOWETr, supra note i, at 501 (referring to the United Nations Security Force (UNEF),
and then to MONUC, but the statement applies to any UN peacekeeping operation).
263. Id. at 502.
264. Murphy, supra note 30, at 182-83 (assuming the UN and those who attack them should be
covered by one regime or the other, but not both, so as "not to undermine the Geneva Conventions,
which rely in part for their effectiveness on all forces being treated equally").
265. Oeter, supra note 231, at 217.
266. Bouvier, supra note 236, at 659.
267. They are "organs placed at the disposal of an international organization by a State" in the
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authorized by the Security Council but launched and fully controlled by
sovereign States individually or within a coalition, peacekeeping
operations are subsidiary organs of the UN, established by and under the
political authority of a principal organ and put under the command and
control of the Secretary-General.2 The acts of the blue helmets are
attributable to the UN, and the organization should thus bear
responsibility for such acts if they violate its international obligations
under humanitarian law. This, however, does not resolve the question of
whether there may be other forms of responsibility, alternative or
complementary, to the UN's, in particular from troop-contributing
States. This Part will address these issues.
i. United Nations' Responsibility
As an international legal person, the UN will bear international
responsibility if an act that is attributable to it infringes an international
obligation by which it is bound. 69 We have already seen which
international humanitarian obligations bind UN peacekeeping forces.
Such responsibility includes that of the UN's principal and subsidiary
organs, as well as acts or omissions of its "agents," including officials and
"other persons acting for the United Nations on the basis of functions
conferred by an organ of the organization.""' Whether considered to be
subsidiary organs or mere agents, peacekeeping forces act on behalf of
the UN and their acts are attributable to the UN. This applies not only to
acts in the field, but also to the planning of operations.27' In Resolution
1353, following a debate on "[s]trengthening cooperation with troop-
contributing countries," the Security Council addressed the need to hold
consultation meetings with troop-contributing States on "operational
issues," such as mission planning, authorization to use force, the chain of
command, force structure, unity and cohesion of the force, etc. 72 The fact
that only consultation with troop-contributing States is envisaged shows
that the actual decision-making power on all these issues belongs
exclusively to UN organs.
The Secretary-General's Bulletin adheres fully to this principle.
Under section 3, "the United Nations undertakes to ensure that the force
shall conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules
terms used by the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur. Second Report, supra note
I31, at 14.
268. See discussion supra Part I.
269. Jean-Marc Sorel, La responsabilit des Nations Unies dans les operations de maintien de la
paix, 3 INT'L L.F. 127, 130 (20O).
270. Second Report, supra note 131, at 9.
271. KNOOPS, supra note 45, at 329 (stressing that "[i]t is evident that the promulgation of Rules of
Engagement is to be considered as an act 'under state characterization and in the name of the state' or
pursuant to acts of an international organization (United Nations) or intergovernmental organization
(NATO)").
272. S.C. Res. 1353, Annex I, 3 B.4., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1353 (June 13, 2001).
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of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military
personnel. 2 73 The UN also undertakes to ensure that members of the
force's military personnel are "fully acquainted" with those principles
and norms. The language of both commitments reflects a duty to achieve
a particular outcome, rather than just an obligation to attempt certain
conduct or behavior. It is the UN's undertaking that the force shall
actually be fully acquainted with and fully respect international
humanitarian law, at least within the scope of the Bulletin. Consistent
with these principles, the Legal Counsel of the UN has stated that:
As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping
force is, in principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed
in violation of an international obligation entails the international
responsibility of the Organization and its liability in compensation. The
fact that any such act may have been performed by members of a
national military contingent forming part of the peacekeeping
operation does not affect the international responsibility of the United
Nations vis-A-vis third States or individuals. 
7 4
The UN will not avoid responsibility even if the conduct of its agents
on the ground has interfered ultra vires with the formal commands or
policies of the mission, leading to the undesired breach of humanitarian
law.7 5 In this respect, the Special Rapporteur has proposed a provision
on "excess of authority or contravention of instructions" which would be
worded as follows: "The conduct of an organ, an official or another
person entrusted with part of the organization's functions shall be
considered an act of the organization under international law if the
organ, official or person acts in that capacity, even though the conduct
exceeds authority or contravenes instructions. '276
The UN's assumption of full responsibility leads us to the dual issue
of how the UN should proceed to make reparations for its wrongful acts
and whether this assumption waives other forms of responsibility of
troop-contributing States. As for the forms of reparations, the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility provides a pattern that can be applied,
mutatis mutandis, to international organizations." Restitution, when
possible, should be the first option, and though very often restitution will
273. The Bulletin, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
274. Second Report, supra note 131, at 18 (citing Letter from Hans Corell, UN Legal Counsel, to
Vfclav Mikulka, Director of the Codification Division (Feb. 3, 2004)).
275. Second Report, supra note 131, at 25 ("While the 'off-duty' conduct of a member of a national
contingent [of peacekeeping forces] would not be attributed to the organization, the 'on-duty' conduct
may be so attributed, although one would have to consider how any ultra vires conduct relates to the
functions entrusted to the person concerned.").
276. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). A similar provision, but concerning State organs, is found in the
current project on State responsibility. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 85.
277. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 85, arts. 34-39.
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be impractical, the UN will normally resort to compensation in its
stead . 79 The fact that SOFAs accord immunity to UN forces from
domestic prosecution should not be construed in any way as an obstacle
to obtaining financial compensation. What is at issue here is not a
domestic claim, but an international dispute between international
subjects to which the UN is not at all immune." °
Likewise, the duty to make reparations in the form of compensation
is not diminished by the General Assembly's 1998 adoption of a
resolution intended to limit the UN's liability for damages incurred
during peacekeeping operations."" This resolution is aimed at
supplementing paragraph 51 of the SOFA establishing the creation of a
standing claims commission to solve any dispute of a "private law"
character relating to a peacekeeping operation or any of its members
that national courts cannot address because of the jurisdictional
immunities acknowledged in the SOFA itself. 82 The resolution is only
recommendatory to member States but is legally binding on the UN to
host States under subsequent SOFAs. s3 It establishes two statutes of
limitations: six months after the wrongdoing occurred and one year after
the termination of the operation. It includes a damages limitation of
$50,000. 85 It is arguable whether such limitations, and in particular
financial ones, should apply at all to violations by UN troops of
international humanitarian law. First, the resolution acknowledges that
the limitations do not apply to claims "resulting from gross negligence or
willful misconduct of the personnel provided by troop-contributing
States for peacekeeping operations. ' '2s While not referring explicitly to
violations of international law, the exclusion of willful misconduct could
be understood as encompassing these sorts of claims. Second, both
278. Id. art. 35. Re-establishing the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed
may be, as article 35 acknowledges, "materially impossible," particularly when a violation of
international humanitarian law is at stake. Id.
279. Id. art. 36 (noting "insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution," the State
International Organization responsible is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused
thereby, and compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits).
28o. In this respect I strongly disagree with Jennifer Murray, supra note 107, at 518-19, who
suggests that the UN cannot be held accountable for its internationally wrongful acts because of its
immunity to domestic prosecution.
281. Third Party Liability: Temporal and Financial Limitations, G.A. Res. 52/247, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/247 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Third Party Liability].
282. SOFA, supra note 33. Shagra, supra note 98, at 4o9 explains that those commissions have
never been created. Instead, UN-based claims review boards were established, "in almost every
peacekeeping operation to settle third-party claims for personal injury, property loss, or damage
attributable to activities of members of the force in the performance of their official duties." Shagra,
supra note 98, at 409.
283. Shagra, supra note 98, at 411.
284. Third Party Liability, supra note 281, 91 8.
285. Id. 91 9.
286. Id. 7.
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paragraph 51 of the SOFA and resolution 52/247 refer to "private"
claims, and though it goes without saying that violations of international
humanitarian law may imply some harm to citizens and private entities,
the duty of the UN to make reparations in this case derives from a
different source: the international relationship between the UN and the
host State and the fundamental principle of international law that "an
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. 2 7
Nothing prevents the host State from agreeing on a limitation of its right
to claim compensation, but this renunciation cannot be presumed,2' and
the General Assembly's resolution cannot be understood to have this
effect.
It is for this reason that the SOFA provides for the establishment,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, of a tribunal of three arbitrators
to which "any other dispute between the United Nations peace-keeping
operation and the Government" shall be submitted."" If the claims
commission is foreseen for private claims, an international arbitration
seems a much more adequate means for the settlement of disputes
between public entities.2 9
Together with restitution and compensation, a third means of
making reparations is satisfaction, which "may consist in an
acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology
or another appropriate modality."2 9' Nothing seems to impede the United
Nations from carrying out any of the first three forms of satisfaction. As
for "other appropriate modalities," the 1996 version of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility used to provide for the punishment, according to
the criminal or administrative law of the responsible State, of the civil
servants who had actually committed the wrongful act.2 92 This is
consistent with Professor Simmonds's interpretation of article 3 of the
1907 Hague Convention:
In the conception of the traditional law of war, this Article refers to a
responsibility to make reparations for any infractions of the law, but it
is broad enough to include enforcement by trial and punishment of
members of the force who have committed acts or omissions violative
of the laws of war.293
287. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13).
288. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 26 (July 6); see also DAVID BONDIA
GARCIA, RtGIMEN JURfDICO DE LOS ACTOS UNILATERALES DE LOS ESTADOS 105-1O (J. M. Bosch ed., 2004).
289. SOFA, supra note 33, T 53.
290. See Manuel Pdrez GonzAlez, Les organisations internationales et le droit de la responsabilitg,
92 REVUE GgNtRALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 63, 95-98 (1988) (discussing the different forms
and procedures for making effective the responsibility of international organizations).
291. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 85, art. 37.
292. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Eighth Session, art. 45, U.N. Doc. AJ5 s/Io(Supp) (1996).
293. SIMMONDS, supra note 5i, at 194.
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The problem is that there is general agreement, which the Secretary-
General's Bulletin has acknowledged, that "[i]n case of violations of
international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a
United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national
courts." 94 This form of satisfaction is thus precluded for the UN, which
cannot directly punish in any form this particular category of agents."
Since only sovereign States may proceed with this sort of action we must
consider now the responsibility of other subjects involved in the violation
of an international humanitarian law obligation.
2. Individual and State Responsibility
Since its inception, the law of international criminal responsibility
deriving from Nuremberg and Tokyo (and other cases) has been
construed as fully autonomous from State responsibility, in the sense that
the same act may simultaneously constitute an act of State in breach of
an international obligation and an act of the individual or organ of such
State constituting a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity. ,6 There is no question that, in addition to implicating the
international responsibility of the UN, an act of a peacekeeper may
constitute a war crime for which he or she should be held personally
accountable."i As with any other form of war crimes, national
jurisdictions should be the first to prosecute and convict the perpetrator.
In fact, "international peacekeepers have already been subjected to
criminal prosecution by national tribunals. Cases have occurred in which
peacekeepers were tried by national courts for alleged war crimes
committed during peacekeeping operations. '2 8 In addition, the Statute ofthe International Criminal Court allows prosecution of peacekeepers by
294. The Bulletin, supra note 4.
295. This is true both for criminal procedures and disciplinary measures, but does not prevent the
UN from establishing fact-finding mechanisms that may serve not just to gather information, but also
to push governments to carry out more specific sanctions. For example, in December 2005 the UN
mission in Haiti established a disciplinary commission of inquiry to investigate whether peacekeepers
had used excessive force during incidents earlier that year in Haiti's capital. Haiti: UN Sets up Panel
To Probe Report that Peacekeepers Used Excessive Force, UN NEWS SERV., Dec. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=i6884&Cr=haiti&CrI= ("The incidents involving the
'blue helmets' took place in the Sarthe/Cazeau area of Port-au-Prince on 31 October at and around the
Larco drinks plant. Peacekeepers not only reacted in an excessive manner, but they then conducted
inappropriate body searches of the population concerned, according to the early findings, which were
based on interviews with presumed victims and others. MINUSTAH stressed that it was resolute in
applying the zero-tolerance policy in proven cases of bad conduct by persons serving under the UN
flag.")
296. JUAN MANUEL GRAMAJO, EL ESTATUTO DE LA CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL 72 (2003).
297. Glick, supra note 104, at 99 ("Individual responsibility exists for any member of a U.N. armed
force who commits an act constituting a war crime.").
298. KNooPs, supra note 47, at 21. He adds that "[i]n the course of several international, as well as
internal armed conflicts, in the past which led to court martial cases, examples emerge that realistically
could occur within the context of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations" to the "normative
framework of (international) criminal law." Id.
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the ICC;299 a possibility which, in accordance with the principle of
complementarity of the Court," ' does not preclude the traditional
solution of leaving criminal jurisdiction to the troop-contributing States,
but rather adds to it.
30 I
A different issue arises when we consider the responsibility of troop-
contributing States. The International Law Commission's Special
Rapporteur on the responsibility of international organizations has
acknowledged that, in general, "conduct does not necessarily have to be
attributed exclusively to one subject only. 3.. This seems to be
particularly true in the case of peacekeeping operations. We have
already discussed how the Model Contributing Agreement gives "full
authority" over the "deployment, organization, conduct and direction" to
the Secretary-General, who usually delegates it to a commander-in-chief
who leads the operation on the ground.3" Each national contingent,
however, remains under the authority of a national commander,3 4 and
most countries never actually relinquish control over their troops.3 5
Consequently, there are grounds to consider direct State
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law in the
context of their participation in peacekeeping operations. In the first
place, as discussed above, certain obligations under the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols must necessarily be carried out by
the contributing States, such as the disciplinary or penal measures
imposed upon those individuals who violate the Conventions.3 6 A State's
299. Marten Zwanenburg, The Statute for an International Criminal Court and the. United States:
Peacekeepers Under Fire?, 1o EUR. J. INT'L L. 124, 124 (1999).
300. Rome Statute, supra note 78, art. 17.
301. Zwanenburg, supra note 299, at 130, 132.
302. Second Report, supra note 131, T 3; see Pdrez Gonzilez, supra note 290, at 85-92 (discussing
the possibility of concurrent responsibility of States and International Organizations, and the different
situations in which it may happen); see also Condorelli, supra note 182, at 895-97.
303. Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 7 (emphasis added).
304. Id. 8.
305. Ray Murphy, Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of
Canadian and Irish Forces, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICr L. 41, 71 (I999), states that under Canadian law, at no
stage in any international operation is national command of Canadian forces handed over to a foreign
commander. A similar provision in Irish law leads Professor Murphy to argue that, by relinquishing
such control, the Defense Minister of Ireland may have acted ultra vires. Id. He concludes that the
legal obligation on members of the Irish or Canadian forces to obey UNIFIL or the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) standing operating procedures remains uncertain "as they have no
status under Irish military law." Id.
306. See Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, T 25 ("[The participating State] agrees to
exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences which may be committed by its military
personnel serving with [the United Nations peacekeeping operation]"); see also The Bulletin, supra
note 4, § 4 ("In case of violations of international humanitarian law members of the military personnel
of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts"). Besides what the law
provides, "national sensitivities unavoidably associated with participation in UN military operations
render it desirable that contributing states should have and be seen to have disciplinary authority over
their own forces." McCoubrey, supra note 52, at 45.
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failure to prosecute in such a case would be its responsibility alone, not
an act attributable to the United Nations. °7 Likewise, training troops in
the intricacies of international humanitarian law is also a State duty °8 A
crash course by the UN prior to the deployment of the mission and/or in
the country of operations may be mandatory according to section 3 of the
Bulletin,3" but will not do much good if soldiers are completely unaware
of such a complex topic before they are placed under the authority of the
United Nations." ' Lastly, "the decisive question in relation to attribution
of a given conduct appears to be who had effective control over the
conduct in question.. 3 I. In other words, States will be held accountable
for acts that violate international humanitarian law and that are
attributable to the States and not to the UN.3 2
What remains to be seen, then, is whether troop-contributing States
should be held accountable even when the UN is also internationally
responsible for the breach of humanitarian law in the context of a
peacekeeping operation. Although the Secretary-General's Bulletin
remains silent on this issue, some authors have interpreted the
assumption by the UN of responsibility over peacekeepers' actions as an
acceptance of "co-responsibility" with the contributing States.3 3
According to Common Article i to the Geneva Conventions, "ilt is
difficult to posit any persuasive theories which would release a State's
military forces from the binding force of the laws of war, as a matter of
law, simply because they are engaged in fulfilling a United Nations
mandate."3 '4 The duty to respect international humanitarian law "in all
circumstances" means that, in spite of being under the authority of the
United Nations, national contingents remain directly bound by
"customary [international humanitarian law] (because that is binding
307. This exclusive responsibility does not exempt the United Nations from an obligation to
exercise some supervisory jurisdiction over such prosecutions." Tittemore, supra note I7, at IlI.
3o8. First Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 47; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 6i,
art. 48; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 127; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 61,
art. 144.
309. See Palwankar, supra note 18, at 234.
31o. For this reason, the Model Contributing Agreement, supra note 34, 28 states: "[The
participating State] shall therefore ensure that the members of its national contingent serving with [the
United Nations peace-keeping operation] be fully acquainted with the principles and spirit of these
Conventions."
311. Second Report, supra note 131, 1 40.
312. Id. ("[T]he Force Commander of UNOSOM II was not in effective control of several national
contingents which, in varying degrees, persisted in seeking orders from their home authorities before
executing orders of the Forces Command.") (citing The Secretary-General, Report of the Commission
of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks
on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them, J 243-44, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (June I, 1994)).
313. Murphy, supra note 30, at 177 (referring to the UN's duty to ensure that military personnel
are fully acquainted with the rules of humanitarian law).
314. BowErr, supra note i, at 503-04 (referring to peacekeeping operations).
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upon both the states from which they come and the United Nations) and
the relevant IHL conventions (because they are binding upon the states
concerned)."3 '5 Decision-making at the highest level, including the
issuance of orders and commands, is probably the only level of
responsibility that would be attributable exclusively to the UN.
3 6
Although it seems unlikely that the UN will issue an instruction that is
per se inconsistent with its obligations under international humanitarian
law, this possibility cannot be completely discarded. But even if it did,
this would not waive the State's primary obligation to comply with these
rules on the ground,"7 for "[t]he obligation to observe U.N. command
and control never requires a state contingent to execute U.N. orders that
violate IHL. '31 8 The State is, thus, always responsible for any breach of
international humanitarian law that may be committed by its national
troops under UN command and control, irrespective of the
responsibility, or lack of it, if the act is not attributable to it, of the UN.
Obviously, this implies that the duty to make reparations will be shared,
not doubled, by the UN and the contributing State.3"9 It is beyond the
scope of this paper to determine the forms how this concurrent duty to
make reparations can be made effective.3"'
CONCLUSION
Since the late 1940s the establishment, deployment, and execution of
peacekeeping operations under the command and control of the UN has
produced an impressive record of success. Nonetheless, a number of
worrying shadows have appeared, and among them are the increasing
number of allegations and findings that the blue helmets have committed
grave violations of the norms of international human rights and
humanitarian law; as well as the reluctance of the UN itself, until fairly
recently, to acknowledge its duty to ensure that its peacekeepers observe
315. Greenwood, supra note i, at I8; see also KNOOPS, supra note 47, at 33o-3I ("Party states ...
have a dual responsibility: that of applying the stipulated provisions themselves, as well as the
dissemination ... in all circumstances.").
316. KNooPs, supra note 47, at 329.
317. BOWETr, supra note I, at 504-05 ("[E]ven should the United Nations fail to declare its
intentions with respect to those laws, the better legal opinion would probably hold that no analogy to
pleas of superior orders would exculpate the national contingents from their duty to adhere to all the
relevant rules.").
318. Glick, supra note 104, at 99. He bases his assertion on the duty of troop contributing States, as
non-parties to the conflict, "to ensure respect" for international humanitarian law. Id. at 98-99. He
seems to contradict himself, though, when he insists that the United Nations "alone" is internationally
responsible for violations committed by troops under its command and control, id. at 97, 99, and seems
to deny the possibility of co-responsibility when stating that "[w]hen a troop contingent is acting in the
capacity of a UN organ ... it can not also be acting in the capacity of an organ or the contributing
State," id. at ioi.
319 . Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.CJ. S77, o85 (Apr. i n).
320. See Condorelli, supra note 182, at 895-97, 899.
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international humanitarian law in the field.
International humanitarian law consists of more than a hundred
treaties and other international instruments which, in their core
elements, have become general customary law, binding upon all subjects
of the international community, sovereign States, and international
organizations alike. The evolutionary nature of this body of law, as
expressed by the Martens Clause, implies the need to interpret its rules,
including those that determine their own applicability, beyond the literal
wording of the provisions in the main treaties. Those rules in fact must
operate in situations that were not foreseen, because they simply did not
exist, in 19o7 or 1949, or were as yet undeveloped in 1977. Even though
the letter of the Geneva and Hague Conventions and Protocols may not
always perfectly fit peacekeeping operations, interpreters and
practitioners need to look beyond the actual terms of the relevant
treaties to ascertain their spirit. We must determine whether it is
reasonable for these rules to bind neutral armies on the ground, i.e.,
peacekeeping troops provided by contributing States.
Most authors consider the agreement of the host State, and the
eventual agreement of the other warring factions, to be crucial to the
deployment and goals of a peacekeeping mission. Typically, however,
such agreement is weak and forced on one or more parties to the conflict.
Even when the agreement is robust, peacekeepers may still find
themselves, once deployed, in armed conflict. More often than not,
peacekeeping operations are deployed in situations that are non-
peaceful, to say the least, and this fact should be enough to affirm the de
jure applicability of the Geneva and other relevant Conventions to these
troops, both as a means of protection from the parties-at least until a
better r6gime is established-and as a set of duties the peacekeepers
must respect.
The UN Secretary-General has, in essence, accepted this view by
adopting the Bulletin on the Observance by UN Forces of International
Humanitarian Law. The importance of the document cannot be over
emphasized. Though concise, it is a very effective synthesis of hundreds
of provisions scattered in at least a dozen international treaties. It is a
document that can be disseminated among troops in a relatively easy and
fast manner. Its binding character, both as an internal command from a
superior (the Secretary-General) to a subsidiary organ (the peacekeeping
operation) as well as an exposition of the main customary obligations of
the United Nations in this area, is beyond doubt. The main grounds for
criticism lie in the Bulletin's narrow or ambiguous scope. The first
section of the Bulletin provides that it should only be observed by
peacekeepers when they are actively engaged in armed combat as
combatants. The rest of the Bulletin, however, demonstrates that it
mandates more than that.
February 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
International humanitarian law is applicable, to the UN or to any
international subject, in any armed conflict. And, as explained above,
given the facts on the ground and the Martens Clause, the United
Nations needs to observe international humanitarian law de jure in
peacekeeping operations more often than not. In these cases, the only
limitation on the UN's obligations lies in those areas where the
Organization is truly incapable of discharging such duties, that is,
whenever it is materially impossible for the UN to respect them.
In terms of its scope, the Bulletin provides only a minimum
threshold, not a ceiling, and the same is true of its substantive provisions.
Beyond the instructions laid down by the Bulletin, persons detained by
UN troops, if they are actual combatants, should be treated de jure as
prisoners of war. When the United Nations administers a territory, the
Fourth Geneva Convention is the minimum rule that the Organization
and its agents must observe. Likewise, UN forces must also ensure that
other parties to the conflict also observe their international humanitarian
obligations. This does not mean that the peacekeepers should put
themselves in harms' way, but they must take the appropriate measures,
commensurate with their strength and position in the conflict, to achieve
this result. Finally, the reference rules for UN forces in these situations
are those relating international armed conflicts, irrespective of the
domestic or international nature of the underlying armed conflict.
Blue helmets must respect and ensure respect of the relevant norms
of international humanitarian law in every situation that calls for its
application. They are simultaneously permanently protected by the
provisions of the 1994 Safety Convention, an international treaty that
builds upon pre-existing treaty and customary obligations and defines the
protected status of UN agents as experts in mission. Admittedly, this
implies that UN troops are treated differently from other parties in the
conflict: they must respect international humanitarian law but are
shielded by a set of norms that establish a higher standard of protection.
The set of rights and duties at stake for the different actors is unbalanced
because UN peacekeeping forces are neither belligerents nor parties to
the conflict. Given their mission and status, UN forces deserve a larger
degree of protection. This does not, however, preclude them from being
burdened by legal obligations, particularly those that require them to
comply with the rules of international humanitarian law.
In case of an infringement of international humanitarian law by a
peacekeeping operation, there is little doubt that the United Nations as a
legal entity will bear international responsibility and will be obliged to
make reparations for any injury caused by such breach. But it will not be
the only responsible subject. Individuals, in case the breach amounts to a
war crime, will be subject to international prosecution by the
International Criminal Court or by any other appropriate national
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tribunal. And, more importantly, the contributing State whose troops
have actually committed the breach will also be responsible, because
States always control the final implementation of UN commands on the
ground, and they have the duty to respect humanitarian law in "all
circumstances."
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